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MISREPRESENTATION B Y LAWYERS ABOUT 
CREDENTIALS OR EXPERIENCE 
VINCENT R. JOHNSON" & SHAWN M. LOVORN"" 
I. The Problem 
To what extent must a lawyer disclose to a client or a potential client 
unfavorable facts relating to the lawyer's credentials or prior experience? 
Must a lawyer reveal, with respect to the area of the law in which the 
layperson seeks legal services, the nature and extent of the lawyer's training, 
prior work, or results obtained on behalf of other clients? 
For example, is it necessary for a lawyer to tell a client that the lawyer: 
(1) failed, did poorly in, or neglected to take relevant law school courses? (2) 
has handled no, only one, or just a few similar cases? (3) has not performed 
similar work in a long time or without assistance from another lawyer? (4) 
lacks board certification in the relevant spec iaIty? (5) has never handled a case 
involving injuries or damages as great as those in the proposed representation? 
(6) was unable to secure, or secured an inadequate. recovery when 
representing a client with a similar claim? (7) was subject to sanctions, 
grievances, or malpractice claims in connection with prior work? (8) was 
asked to leave a former law firm because of allegedly poor work habits? (9) 
is presently, or was previously, suspended from the practice of law? (10) was 
earlier disbarred, then subsequently reinstated? (11) is now, or was previously, 
addicted to illegal drugs? or (12) was charged with, or found guilty of, 
criminal conduct relating to a client or other matter? These questions are 
important because lawyers must continually decide what information should 
be provided to clients. 
The issue here is not competence to undertake the proposed representation 
but disclosure of information relating to the client's selection of counselor 
continuation of representation. With respect to the obligation of competence, 
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the law is clear that a lawyer may accept a case in an area in which the lawyer 
has not previously practiced, provided that the attorney can rise to the level of 
performance expected of a reasonably prudent attorney through self-study or 
by associating with other lawyers with whom the client consents. l However, 
even if competence can be achieved in a timely fashion, the question remains 
whether the lawyer must tell the client that he presently lacks certain 
credentials or experience. In addition, must the lawyer provide the client with 
information - particularly, unfavorable information - upon which the client 
can judge the breadth, depth, and efficacy of the lawyer's credentials and 
experience? 
Authorities appropriately condemn dishonesty by attorneys in the broadest 
terms.2 In moving from moral principles to legal liability, however, it is 
important to think carefully about when it is that a lawyer's conduct misleads 
a client in a way that is actionable. As discussed below, whether liability will 
be imposed depends upon the nature of the misrepresentation, the status of the 
plaintiff, the theory of liability, and the presence of competing interests or 
special considerations. 
First, there are three important types of conduct that may result in 
misrepresentation: (1) silence; (2) potentially misleading statements, such as 
half-truths and statements of opinion, including puffing; and (3) outright 
deception based on false statements. Tort law typically deals with these types 
I. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONouer R. I.l (2002) ("A lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knOWledge, 
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."). The 
comment to Rule 1.1 provides: 
A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle 
legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar .... A lawyer can 
provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. 
Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer 
of established competence in the field in question. 
Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 2. See generally RESTATEMENT (1'HIRo) OFTHE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 52 
(2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS] (stating "a lawyer who 
owes a duty of care must exercise the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers 
in similar circumstances"); see also In re Discipline ofLaprath, 670 N.W.2d 41, 62 (S.D. 2(03) 
(asserting that "mere length of time one is a member of the [State] Bar does not equate with 
superior professional skills and competence"); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A 
cmt. d (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF TORTS] (noting an actor may make it clear that the 
actor has less than the minimum skill common to the profession or trade and then is only 
required to exercise the skill the actor represents). 
2. See, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 685 (1990) 
(opining that "[slelf-interested deception of clients by lawyers should be prohibited. There is 
no justification for allowing lawyers to mislead their clients about their experience or 
expertise .... "). 
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of conduct differently,3 and arguably, the same will be true with respect to 
cases involving the disclosure duties of attorneys. For example, if a lawyer 
has handled only one similar matter for another client with moderate success, 
whether the lawyer has violated applicable disclosure obligations to another 
client may depend upon whether the lawyer (1) says nothing about prior 
experience (remains silent), (2) says "I have done good work in this area" 
(makes a potentially misleading statement), or (3) says "I have handled many 
of these cases" (tells an outright lie). 
Second, lawyers owe clients different obligations than nonclients. Clients 
are entitled to what might be called "first-class treatment," which means, 
among other things, that the lawyer must exercise reasonable care to keep the 
client apprised of relevant information.4 In some, but certainly not all, 
contexts, a lawyer owes a client a duty of "absolute and perfect candor."s The 
interests of nonclients and potential clients are typically accorded less 
protection.6 Certain rules of tort law, however, impose on attorneys important 
obligations to prospective clients or third parties.? 
3. See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 1. § 525 cmt. d (discussing 
opinions); id. § 527 (discussing ambiguous representations); id. § 529 (discussing half-truths); 
id. § 550 (discussing fraudulent concealment); id. § 551 (discussing liability fornondisclosure); 
see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 736-40 (5th ed. 1984) 
[hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS] (discussing the difference between representation 
and nondisclosure). 
4. See Vincent R. Johnson, "Absolute and Perfect Candor" to Clients, 34 ST. MARY'S 
L.J. 737, 779 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson, Candor] (explaining that within the attorney/client 
relationship, the attorney "must place the client's interests above all others"). 
5. See id. at 792-93 (stating that the duty of "absolute and perfect candor" should be 
"limited to situations where the interests of attorney and client are adverse, ... or to the few 
areas in which particular rules of conduct call for a high degree of disclosure .... " Otherwise, 
the attorney must simply "act reasonably in providing information to the client."). 
6. See Ruden v. Jenk, 543 N.W.2d 605, 610 (Iowa 1996) (stating that liability generally 
only extends to an attorney's clients); RESTATEMENT OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note I, § 15 (discussing the obligations of an attorney to a client and potential client); see also 
One Nat' I Bank v. Antonellis, 80 F.3d 606, 609 (I st Cir. 1996) (stating that "[i]t must be shown 
that the attorney should reasonably foresee that the nonclient will rely upon him for legal 
services"). 
7. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 604 
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (indicating that, under Texas law, an attorney may be liable to a nonclient for 
fraudulent misrepresentation); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Iowa 1987) 
(indicating that an attorney may be held liable to an heir or testamentary beneficiary (nonclient) 
when the attorney's error causes a testamentary document to be invalid); Brody v. Ruby, 267 
N.W.2d 902. 906 (Iowa 1978) (stating that for an attorney to be liable for legal malpractice, a 
third party must be an intended and direct beneficiary of the attorney's services). But see Am. 
Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Tex. 1992) (noting that "Texas 
courts have been understandably reluctant to permit a malpractice action by a nonclient because 
of the potential interference with the duties an attorney owes to the client"). 
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Third, disclosure obligations may be imposed under a variety of legal 
theories. Some theories defining attorney duties are more demanding than 
others. Theories offering the most useful points of reference include deceit 
(more commonly called "fraud"), negligent misrepresentation, lack of 
informed consent, and breach of fiduciary duty. However, even if a particular 
theory of tort liability applies, the obligations that it imposes may be subject 
to qualifications or exceptions based on duties owed by the attorney to other 
present or former clients. For example, if well-established rules of 
professional conduct require a lawyer to keep certain information secret, such 
as the amount of a settlement the lawyer secured for another client pursuant 
to a confidentiality agreement, other principles of law will not necessitate that 
the lawyer reveal that information. "[T]here is never a duty to disclose to one 
client what must be held confidential to protect another."s 
Finally, in some contexts, the attorney's privacy interests or other important 
considerations may trump rules that would otherwise require disclosure of 
information about credentials or experience. For example, a lawyer 
presumably does not have to disclose to a client a disciplinary sanction in the 
nature of a private reprimand.9 In that situation, there has already been a 
judicial or quasi-judicial determination that the public interest is best served 
by the reprimand being private, rather than public. IO As a second example, 
8. Johnson, Candor, supra note 4, at 787-88. Note, however, that when a lawyer cannot 
tell one client material information about another client, there may be a conflict of interest that 
will subject the lawyer to ethical obligations, which, if not heeded, may result in disciplinary 
and legal liability. [d. at 787 ("In the most extreme case, ethics rules require the lawyer to 
decline or withdraw from proposed or existing representation, rather than breach 
confidentiality. "). 
9. Cf Charles E. Lundberg, Making Private Discipline a Public Matter, BENCH & BAR OF 
MINN., Feb. 2003, at 1, available at http://www2.mnbar.orglbenchandbar/2003/feb03/ 
prof-resp.htm. The article states: 
Every year over 100 Minnesota lawyers receive Rule 8(d)(2) private 
admonitions - written findings that a disciplinary rule has been violated but that 
the violation is isolated and non-serious and therefore the lawyer is privately 
admonished. An admonition goes on the lawyer's permanent record, but normally 
remains strictly confidential under Rule 20. The lawyer may sometimes have to 
disclose the admonition "voluntarily," in the context of a legal malpractke 
insurance renewal application, an application for a judgeship or other public 
office, etc. But it will normally never become public in the sense of being in the 
newspaper. 
Id. at 1. 
10. But see Benjamin Hoom Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic 
Analysis of the Justificationsfor Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 429. 485-86 
(2001) ("[LJawyer disciplinary systems should be altered to allow the greatest possible flow of 
information to the public .... Disciplinary bodies should make all client complaints a matter of 
public record .... Lawyers who have been disciplined should be required to disclose the 
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consider the domestic privacy interests of lawyers. Those interests ordinarily 
mean an attorney has no duty to disclose to a client marital difficulties that 
may affect the lawyer's performance. II 
The questions mentioned at the beginning of this Article regarding the 
disclosure obligations of attorneys are not theoretical. Malpractice plaintiffs 
often allege that their attorneys lacked necessary credentials or experience. 12 
It is but a short step from the malpractice allegation of incompetence to a 
claim that the lawyer not only lacked proper credentials or experience, but 
also failed to disclose or otherwise misrepresented information about those 
deficiencies, thereby depriving the client of the opportunity to make an 
informed decision in selecting counselor choosing a course of action. Clients 
have made precisely those types of misrepresentation claims in recent legal 
malpractice cases. 13 
discipline to any new customers."); Melvin Hirschman. Private Discipline Comes to an End, 
MD. BAR J., May/June 2003, at 58, 58 (indicating that "under [Maryland's] new disciplinary 
rules of procedure all reprimands are public"). 
11. Cf Albany Urology Clinic, P.e. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 782 n.19 (Ga. 2000) 
(suggesting that there is no duty to disclose where a doctor, "the night before receiving patients, 
is served with divorce papers"). 
A lawyer who is having marital difficulties has a duty to act reasonably. In an extreme case, 
where the difficulties pose a serious threat to the representation, the lawyer may have a duty to 
disclose the risks or withdraw. Cf MODEL RUlES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 1.16(a)(2) (2002) 
(stating that "a lawyer shall not represent a client ... if ... the lawyer's physical or mental 
condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client"). In addition, a false 
statement about marital status may be actionable. See Walter v. Stewart, 67 P.3d 1042, 1048 
(Utah Ct. App. 2003) (holding that an attorney's misrepresentation to a former client, with 
whom the attorney had a sexual relationship, that he was not married was "material" for 
purposes of stating a claim for fraud action against the attorney). 
12. See, e.g., Lehrer v. Supkis, No. 01-00-00112-CV, 2002 WL 356394 (Tex. App. Feb. 
28, 2002). A former client alleged that an attorney (Supkis) "was not qualified to represent 
him" because "Supkis ... had never tried a case involving divorce, breach of fiduciary duty, 
fraud, and [Deceptive Trade Practices Act] claims, and he was not board certified in family 
law." Id. at *3. In upholding ajury verdict that the attorney was not negligent, the court found 
that the former client had failed to "state how Supkis's lack of experience in trying these types 
of cases constituted or contributed to an act of negligence." [d. 
13. See, e.g., Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2000). In Baker, the trial court 
found that the defendant attorney "made and acknowledged" the following misrepresentations: 
1. He opened his own practice not in 1991, as he represented to Baker, but 
only one month before he met Baker in 1994. 
2. The first jury he had selected was that which heard this case against him. 
3. He was not even admitted to practice law until 1992. 
4. At the time he gave his resume to Baker in 1994, he was not a member of 
the New Jersey or Massachusetts bars despite having passed the bar exam in each 
of those states. 
5. As of 1994, he had not yet represented a single health care organization as 
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The difference between allegations of incompetence and misrepresentation 
is important. Incompetence ordinarily will not support an action for anything 
more than lack of care, which includes actions for negligence (lack of ordinary 
care) or recklessness (extreme lack of care). Misrepresentation, in contrast, 
may support a claim for intentional fraud,14 and will thus carry with it 
advantages, such as the possibility of punitive damages,15 the irrelevance of 
their attorney. 
6. He had not created the L.L.M. in Health Care Law at NYU, but instead had 
met with the dean and designed his own individual course of study. 
7. He still has not completed his studies to receive the L.L.M. degree from 
NYU. 
8. He had not actually taught a course at NYU, but was a tutor. 
9. He had not done any work at all for private companies concerning the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. 
10. The public company for which he had done per diem work was the 
Department of Juvenile Justice. 
II. He had not done any work in the area of labor relations. 
12. The particularly difficult or important cases for which he had served as 
special litigation counsel were landlord-tenant cases that he did on a per diem 
basis. 
13. All of the other cases referenced in his resume were cases in which he 
acted on a per diem basis hired by counsel. 
Id. at 424 (internal quotations and alterations omitted); see also Griffin v. Fowler, 579 S.E.2d 
848 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a former client failed to prove that an attorney 
misrepresented his experience and knowledge in estate planning matters); Miller v. Kennedy 
& Minshew, P.e., 142 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. App. 2003). In Miller, the plaintiffs claimed that an 
attorney, by way of misrepresentations about his expertise, had induced them to engage the firm 
to represent their interests in their dispute with the other owners of a small telecommunications 
company. Miller, 142 S. W.3d at 331,343. The alleged misrepresentations concerning expertise 
may have played a role in the findings against the attorney and the law firm, but the complexity 
of the facts, arguments, and appellate opinion make it impossible to say precisely what role, if 
any, the alleged misrepresentations had in the decision of the case. 
In addition, there have been several recent parallel decisions involving the credentials or 
experience of other professionals. See, e.g., Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 800 A.2d 
73 (N.J. 2002) (holding that a patient could sue a neurosurgeon on a lack-of-informed-consent 
theory, but not for fraud, with respect to alleged misrepresentation of experience and 
credentials); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Commonwealth Fin. Group, 874 F. SUpp. 
1345, 1353-54 (S.D. Fla. I 994)(stating that, under the antifraud provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange Act, "[mjisrepresentations regarding the trading record and experience of a firm or 
broker are fraudulent because past success and experience are material factors which a 
reasonable investor would consider when deciding to invest in commodity options"). 
14. See infra Part II.A (discussing actions for fraud). 
15. See Baker, 239 F.3d at 418 (awarding punitive damages against an attorney who 
committed resume fraud); Griffin, 579 S.E.2d at 853 (stating that if the plaintiff had proven that 
an attorney had fraudulently misrepresented his expertise or experience, the client would have 
been entitled to punitive damages as part of his legal malpractice claim); cf McKinnon v. 
Tibbetts, 440 A.2d 1028, 1030 (Me. 1982) (holding that although the plaintiff amended a legal 
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the contributory negligence defense, 16 the nondischargeability of a judgment 
in bankruptcy, 17 and, in some states, a longer statute of limitations 18 and joint 
and several liability.19 Also, because misrepresentation often involves a 
breach of the duty ofloyalty, it may constitute the type of fiduciary duty claim 
that will support forfeiture of attorney fees, even if the client has suffered no 
actual damages.2o This is important because malpractice plaintiffs 
malpractice complaint sounding in negligence to allege fraud, the evidence failed to show that 
the attorney acted with malice or wanton and reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights, and 
therefore a punitive damages award could not be sustained, even though fraud was proved). 
16. Fraud requires proof of intentional or reckless misrepresentation. See infra Part 11.0.1 
(discussing the requirement of scienter). If the fraud was intentionally, rather than recklessly 
committed, carelessness on the part of the plaintiff will ordinarily not be a defense. See UNIF. 
COMPARATIVE FAULT Acr § l(b) (1977) (defining "fault" as "acts or omissions that are in any 
measure negligent or reckless" and by implication precluding a comparative-fault defense in 
cases where the defendant acts intentionally). 
17. See II U.S.c. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000) (stating that bankruptcy will not discharge a debt 
for "money, property, [or] services ... obtained by ... actual fraud"). 
18. For example, in New York, actions based upon fraud must be commenced within six 
years of "the time the plaintiff ... discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have 
discovered it." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(8) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2004). Other claims are 
typically subject to shorter statutes oflimitations. See id. 214(6) (stating that a three-year statute 
of limitations applies to "an action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, 
dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract 
or tort"). 
Courts sometimes, however, construe statutes of limitations in ways that negate the 
advantages of alleging fraud. See, e.g., Paulos v. Johnson, 597 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1999) (holding that a six-year statute of limitations for fraud actions did not apply to 
allegations that a physician fraudulently solicited plaintiff's business because allegations were 
"supported by evidence directly connected to ... [the physician's] examination, diagnosis, 
treatment and care" of the plaintiff, and were therefore subject to the shorter statute of 
limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions). 
19. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02(1 )(3)(West 2000 & Supp. 2004)(providing that 
"a person who commits an intentional tort" is "jointly and severally liable for the whole 
award"). 
20. See Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229,240 (Tex. 1999) (holding that attorney's breach 
of duty of loyalty to client may justify forfeiture of attorney's fee without proof of actual 
damages); see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS, supra note I, § 37 
(providing that "[a] lawyer engaging in clear and serious violation of duty to a client may be 
required to forfeit some or all of the lawyer's compensation for the matter," depending on "the 
gravity and timing of the violation, its willfulness, its effect on the value of the lawyer's work 
for the client, any other threatened or actual harm to the client, and the adequacy of other 
remedies"); Steve McConnico & Robyn Bigelow, Summary of Recent Developments in Texas 
Legal Malpractice Law, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 607, 625-35 (2002) (discussing fee forfeiture in 
general). 
Incompetence ordinarily is only a breach of the duty of care, not a form of disloyalty. 
Therefore, in states that condition forfeiture on disloyalty, incompetence usually will not suffice 
as the predicatefor forfeiture. See Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 238 (stating that "the central purpose 
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increasingly allege that attorneys' breaches of duty warrant both an award of 
damages and forfeiture of attorney fees. 
What follows is a brief guide to the feasibility, advantages, and limitations 
of alternative theories bearing upon the question of when an attorney is 
subject to tort liability for misrepresenting credentials or experience. Part II 
discusses claims based on fraud, including liability for failure to disclose facts 
basic to a transaction, facts not reasonably discoverable, or facts within the 
scope of a fiduciary relationship. Part II also addresses liability under fraud 
for potentially misleading statements that fall within the categories of half-
truth, opinion, puffing, and state of mind. In addition, this part considers 
liability based on implicit statements of fact and outright lies and examines 
other factors bearing upon the viability of fraud claims, such as the 
requirements of scienter, intent to induce reliance, and causation of damage. 
Furthermore, Part II addresses special considerations relating to claims by 
nonclients and the privacy interests of attorneys. 
Part ill discusses claims relating to misrepresentation of credentials or 
experience that are rooted in negligence, including actions based on negligent 
misrepresentation and lack of informed consent. Finally, Part IV summarizes 
the complex state of the law relating to attorney liability for misrepresentation 
of credentials or experience. 
II. Fraud 
A. Silence 
It has long been said that "silence is golden." This rule applies in the legal 
arena, as in other contexts. In general, there is no duty to disclose information 
merely because another person would find that information useful, interesting, 
or beneficia1.21 In the field of torts, the no-duty-to-speak rule is widely 
applied,22 particularly in fraud actions.23 However, the general rule on silence 
of the equitable remedy of forfeiture is to protect relationships of trust by discouraging agents' 
disloyalty"). 
2 J. See RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TORTS 553 (J 999) ("[NJondisclosures are but instances of 
nonactionable nonfeasance. Just as D is under no obligation to rescue a stranger from peril, so 
too D need not disclose to P any information that might help P to make a firm decision."). 
22. See, e.g., Doe v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417,421 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
reporter had no duty to disclose his intent to disobey judge's instruction to the media not to 
disclose the identity of a sexual assault victim, who testified at trial on condition 0f anonymity); 
Urman v. S. Boston Sav. Bank, 674 N.E.2d 1078, 1080 (Mass. 1997) (finding that a bank 
selling a condominium in a neighborhood that had received a "lot of adverse publicity" had no 
duty to disclose that a toxic waste problem had been recently cleaned up at a nearby school); 
Levine v. Kramer Group, 807 A.2d 264, 270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding that 
builder selling new home had no duty to disclose that a hostile neighbor had raised threatening 
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is subject to several important exceptions. At least three of these exceptions 
are relevant to whether an attorney has a duty to disclose unfavorable 
information about the attorney's credentials or experience.24 The first 
exception concerns facts "basic to the transaction";25 the second exception 
concerns facts "not reasonably discoverable";26 and the third exception 
concerns facts "within the scope of a fiduciary relationship."27 In all 
situations, attorneys' disclosure obligations are limited by a variety of 
considerations, including scope of representation, materiality, client 
knowledge, competing obligations to others, client consent, and threatened 
harm to the client or others.28 Regardless of the theory for imposing a duty of 
disclosure, these considerations may limit the obligations of attorneys. 
I. Facts Basic to the Transaction 
According to the Restatement (Second) o/Torts, there is a duty to disclose 
facts "basic to the transaction," the nondisclosure of which is tantamount to 
deliberate victimization.29 In discussing this exception, the Restatement 
and abusive objections to the house as an "abominable monolith"). 
23. Courts differ somewhat in their articulation of the elements of fraud. Compare Area 
Landscaping, L.L.c. v. Glaxo-Wellcome, Inc., 586 S.E.2d 507, 512 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) 
(naming the elements offraud as "(I) false representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) 
reasonably calculated to deceive, (3) made with the intent to deceive, (4) which does in fact 
deceive, (5) resulting in damage to the injured party"), with Robbins v. Capozzi, 100 S.W.3d 
18, 23 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that claimant must prove "(I) a material representation was 
made, (2) the representation was false, (3) when the representation was made, the speaker knew 
it was false or made the statement recklessly without any knowledge of truth and as a positive 
assertion, (4) the representation was made with the intention that it be acted upon by the other 
party, (5) that party acted in reliance upon the representation, and (6) that party suffered 
injury"). 
24. There are other exceptions that may create a duty to speak in cases involving attorneys 
and clients. For example, there is a duty to update previous statements when new information 
makes them untrue or misleading. See McMahan v. Greenwood, 108 S.W.3d 467, 494 (Tex. 
App. 2003) (stating that even if an attorney was representing only persons other than the 
plaintiff when he allegedly made certain statements, or when he later allegedly failed to disclose 
the falsity of the statements during negotiations, he was still under a duty to disclose the entire 
truth and to correct any misimpressions caused by his earlier statements); 2 FOWI.ER V. HARPER 
ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.14, at 476 (2d ed. 1986). 
25. See infra Part Il.A.I. 
26. See infra Part Il.A.2. 
27. See infra Part II.A.3. 
28. See Johnson, Candor, supra note 4, at 778-92. 
29. The provision states in relevant part: 
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable 
care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated, 
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter 
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commentary explains: 
There are situations in which the defendant not only knows that his 
bargaining adversary is acting under a mistake basic to the 
transaction, but also knows that the adversary, by reason of the 
relation between them, the customs of the trade or other objective 
circumstances, is reasonably relying upon a disclosure of the 
unrevealed fact if it exists. In this type of case good faith and fair 
dealing may require a disclosure. 
It is extremely difficult to be specific as to the factors that give 
rise to this known, and reasonable, expectation of disclosure. In 
general, the cases in which the rule ... has been applied have been 
those in which the advantage taken of the plaintiff s ignorance is 
so shocking to the ethical sense of the community, and is so 
extreme and unfair, as to amount to a form of swindling, in which 
the plaintiff is led by appearances into a bargain that is a trap, of 
whose essence and substance he is unaware.30 
The facts-basic-to-the-transaction exception is narrow,31 and only in the 
rarest of cases involving an attorney and client or prospective client will the 
standard be met. However, in extreme situations, such as where a lawyer fails 
to disclose that he is presently suspended from the practice of law,32 under 
into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship 
between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would 
reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts. 
Comment I adds: 
Thus a seller who knows that his cattle are infected with tick fever ... is not free 
to unload them on the buyer and take his money, when he knows that the buyer 
is unaware of the fact [and] could not easily discover it. 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 551 & cmt t. 
30. Jd. 
31. Compare Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) 
(allowing rescission where vendor of a house, who had informed the media about the existence 
of poltergeists, failed to disclose the dwelling's reputation as a haunted house to a nonlocal 
buyer because "[t]he impact of the reputation thus created goes to the very essence of the 
bargain between the parties, greatly impairing both the value of the property and its potential 
for resale"), with Lithuanian Commerce Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, 179 F.R.D. 450, 478 (D. 
N.J. 1998) (holding that manufacturer's failure to disclose to a distributor negative opinions 
from a marketing survey was not "so shocking to the ethical sense ofthe community, [or] so 
extreme and unfair, as to amount to a form of swindling" that would support an action for 
fraud). 
32. See, e.g., Boston Univ. v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 820 A.2d 1230,1230-33 
(N.J. 2003) (holding that New Jersey attorneys who are not in good standing in the state may 
not rely on their good standing in other states, but must disclose their status in New Jersey, 
when seeking to appear pro hac vice); Attorney Grievance Comm' n of Md. v. Brennan, 714 
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indictment, or addicted to illegal drugs,33 nondisclosure by an attorney may 
involve facts so basic to the transaction as to impose a duty to speak under the 
terms of the Restatement rule. 
2. Facts Not Reasonably Discoverable 
Many tort cases hold that persons have a duty to disclose material facts that 
are not reasonably discoverable.34 This is true even if the facts are not so 
important as to qualify as basic to the transaction.35 The facts need only be 
material and not discoverable through the exercise of reasonable care. 
Materiality simply means that the matter is such that it would be given 
weight in the plaintiff s decision-making process.36 However, the matter need 
A.2d 157, 162-63 (Md. 1997) (holding that a licensed attorney violated the ethics rules by 
assisting a suspended attorney who failed to disclose his suspension to clients); In re Devers, 
974 P.2d 191, 196 (Or. 1999) (holding that an attorney's failure to disclose his suspension to 
opposing counsel violated ethical rules); In re Whipple, 886 P.2d 7, 13 (Or. 1994) (holding that 
an attorney's intentional failure to disclose his suspension when communicating with clients 
about a probate matter was a misrepresentation of a material fact for purposes of the ethics 
rules). But see United States v. Maria-Martinez, 143 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
representing a defendant after being barred from practice does not necessarily compel a finding 
of ineffective assistance of counsel). 
33. But see Albany Urology Clinic, P.e. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 778 (Ga. 2000) 
(holding that a physician had no duty under either common law or the state informed consent 
statute to disclose his drug use); Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213, 215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) 
(holding that failure to inform parents that their child's surgeon was an alcoholic and unlicensed 
did not constitute fraudulent concealment that would estop the defendants from asserting a 
statute of limitations defense); see also Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 
1991) (holding that a physician's failure to inform patients of his chronic alcohol abuse violated 
informed consent requirements). 
34. See, e.g., Busch Oil Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., No. 5:94CVI75, 1996 WL33143114 (W.D. 
Mich. Feb. 20, 1996); Timrn v. Clement, 574 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997); Holcomb v. 
Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1985); Quashnock v. Frost, 445 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1982); Mitchell 
v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 572 (Utah 2001). 
35. See supra Part I1.A.I. The rule regarding facts "basic to the transaction" is a narrower 
concept than that of materiality. HARPER ET AL., supra note 24, § 7.14, at 476. 
36. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 538 (providing that a matter is material 
if "a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining 
his choice of action" or "the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its 
recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his choice of 
action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it"); see also Spector v. Mermelstein, 
361 F. Supp. 30, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified on other grounds, 485 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(defining "material facts" as those "which, if known to the client, might well have caused him, 
acting as a reasonable man, to alter his proposed course of conduct"); Robbins v. Capozzi, 100 
S.W.3d 18,24 (Tex. App. 2002) (defining as "material" information that "a reasonable person 
would attach importance to and would be induced to act on ... in determining his choice of 
actions in the transaction in question"); Lerman, supra note 2, at 686 (stating that while the 
materiality standard often requires disclosure of additional information to clients, "the 
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not be the sole or predominant factor in the plaintiff s decision.37 In many cases, 
materiality is a question of fact for the jury; in others, it is a question of law for 
the court.38 Whether a lawyer, twenty years ago, earned a low grade in a law 
school course dealing with the subject matter of the representation may be 
immaterial as a matter of law. Whether a newly minted lawyer with no other 
relevant experience recently failed the pertinent law school course might raise 
a fact question as to materiality.39 
The exception to the general rule of nondisclosure for facts "not reasonably 
discoverable" may be justified on public policy grounds. Ordinarily there is no 
duty to speak because a rule countenancing nondisclosure creates an incentive 
for persons to actively protect their own interests. Individuals cannot stand idly 
by waiting for others to inform them of everything they need to know. Rather, 
under the general rule, the individual bears the risk of loss: one who fails to 
gather and properly evaluate relevant facts before making a decision risks the 
consequences of making a bad choice. The person who neglects to act diligently 
loses. Thus, "[t]he individualism of the common law requires each person to 
live, or die, by his own wits."4O The general rule permitting nondisclosure 
furthers the law's interest in discouraging the waste of talent and resources.4 ! 
materiality test is not overinclusive; it exempts lawyers from having to disclose a great deal of 
nonessential information"). 
37. Some scholars suggest that the materiality standard requires a great deal in the way of 
disclosure: 
The question is whether the information might cause a reasonable client to 
alter her conduct. 
This "materiality" standard of disclosure appears to require additional 
disclosures in most of the categories of deception .... If the lawyer discloses her 
lack of experience in the area of law in which a client needs service, ... the client 
might choose to retain another lawyer. 
Lerman, supra note 2, at 686. 
38. Cf Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557-58 (Okla. 1979) (holding in a medical 
malpractice case involving the informed consent doctrine that "[tlhere is no bright line 
separating the material from the immaterial; it is a question of fact. A risk is material ifit would 
be likely to affect patient's decision. When non-disclosure of a particular risk is open to debate, 
the issue is for the finder of facts."). 
39. See generally Linda Morton, Finding a Suitable Lawyer: Why Consumers Can't Always 
Get What They Want and What the Legal Profession Should Do About It, 25 V.c. DAVIS L. 
REV. 283 (1992) (discussing the ways in which consumers measure "quality"). With respect 
to attorney credentials and experience, the article discusses client preferences relating to matters 
such as what law school an attorney attended, whether the attorney served on law review, the 
attorney's number of years in practice, and the attorney's win-loss record. Jd. at 288-89. 
40. EpSTEIN, supra note 21, at 553. 
41. VINCENTR. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 9 (3ded. 2005) 
("[T]ort law should encourage individuals to employ available resources to protect their own 
interests, rather than depend upon others to save them from harm. Many would argue that this 
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The exception concerning facts not reasonably discoverable recognizes the 
limits of the general rule that ordinarily permits nondisclosure. If facts are not 
discoverable, it is futile to place the burden of discovery on the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff will simply be relegated to making a potentially bad decision without 
access to material information.42 
Moreover, extending the exception to cases where facts, though discoverable 
through great efforts, are not reasonably discoverable, avoids forcing laypersons 
to hire numerous experts to assist them in their decisions.43 Consequently, one 
court stated: 
Where one party to a contract has ... knowledge which is not within 
the fair and reasonable reach of the other party and which he could 
not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence ... he is under 
a real obligation to speak, and his silence constitutes fraud. 44 
Many of the cases relating to this excepti0f1 have involved the sale or lease 
of real property.45 There is no apparent reason, however, why courts should 
limit the rule to real estate.46 In terms of importance, engaging counsel to handle 
a legal matter may rank as high as, if not higher than, the transfer of an interest 
policy has been on the wane in recent years .... Yet, the continued vitality of the anti-waste or 
self-protection principle can be seen in various areas of the law .... There is a continuous 
struggle to define how much one must do for oneself, and how much one can expect from 
others."). 
42. See Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 676 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) ("Where a 
condition which has been created by the seller materially impairs the value of the contract and 
is peculiarly within the knowledge of the seller or unlikely to be discovered by a prudent 
purchaser exercising due care with respect to the subject transaction, nondisclosure constitutes 
a basis for rescission as a matter of equity. Any other outcome places upon the buyer not merely 
the obligation to exercise care in his purchase but rather to be omniscient with respect to any 
fact which may affect the bargain. No practical purpose is served by imposing such a burden 
upon a purchaser. To the contrary, it encourages predatory business practice and offends the 
principle that equity will suffer no wrong to be without a remedy."). 
43. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 572. 575 (Utah 2001). 
44. Wolfv. Brungardt, 524 P.2d 726.734 (Kan. 1974). 
45. See, e.g., Robbins v. Capozzi, 100 S.W.3d 18.24 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that the 
vendor of a condominium did not have a duty to disclose problems that the vendor's daughter 
had encountered when attempting to park her car in the garage because the purchaser could have 
discovered, by attempting to park there herself, that her vehicle was too large for the allotted 
space). 
46. A related rule - the "peculiar knowledge" doctrine - has been held to apply in other 
situations. "The 'peculiar knowledge' doctrine relates to the reasonableness of claims of 
reliance, finding its theoretical basis in the premise that when matters are peculiarly within the 
defendant's knowledge, plaintiff may rely without prosecuting an investigation, as he has no 
independent means of ascertaining the truth." Unicredito Italiano SPA v. J.P. Morgan Chase 
Bank. 288 F. Supp. 2d 485. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
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in land. If persons selling or leasing property must disclose important facts that 
are not reasonably discoverable, attorneys should be unable to sell legal services 
without disclosing material facts that are not reasonably discoverable. 
Consider how the exception for facts not reasonably discoverable might be 
applied to the context of lawyers and clients. Does a fact qualify as "not 
reasonably discoverable" if a reasonable client would not think to ask about it? 
In the real estate context, one court determined that "the proper standard is 
whether the defect would be apparent to ordinary prudent persons with like 
experience, not to persons with specialized knowledge."47 One may reasonably 
argue that the same standard should apply to matters relating to legal 
representation. 
Presumably, if an undisclosed matter relating to an attorney's credentials or 
experience obviously is connected to the subject matter of the representation, 
that matter should qualify as reasonably discoverable through inquiry, and 
disclosure should not be required. For example, a client can always ask, "Have 
you ever handled this kind of case before?" This type of logical question 
involves information that is reasonably discoverable. There will, of course, be 
difficult cases relating to whether information about credentials or experience 
should be disclosed. For example, has professional malpractice become such a 
part of public consciousness that a client is obliged to ask a lawyer "have you 
been sued for malpractice?" Or is malpractice still so uncommon that the 
reasonable prudent client would not think or have the courage to inquire? There 
is no easy answer to these questions.48 
Most clients do not ask - and, indeed, do not think to ask - whether an 
attorney has ever been disbarred, reprimanded, or suspended from practice. Yet, 
such information about a lawyer's disciplinary history is often easily 
discoverable. In Texas, for example, anyone can go to the State Bar website for 
information about any of the more than 70,000 Texas attorneys,49 including 
public disciplinary sanctions in Texas and other states.50 Similarly, the Internet 
47. Mitchell, 31 P.3d at 575. 
48. In other contexts, courts have sometimes been reluctant to hold that the risk of being 
sued for malpractice was foreseeable. See Westport Ins. Corp. v. Lilley, 292 F. Supp. 2d 165, 
172 (D. Me. 2003) (holding that a future malpractice claim against an insured law firm was not 
foreseeable at the time of an inconclusive and confusing jury verdict and therefore the policy's 
prior-knowledge exclusion was inapplicable). 
49. See TexasBar.com, at http://www.texasbar.com (last visited Jan. 18,2005). 
50. Some persons doubt the usefulness of this approach. While this article was being 
written, a wen known law professor wrote a message to the listserv for the Association of 
Professional Responsibility Lawyers with regard to disclosure of malpractice insurance 
coverage, which stated: 
If the idea is to get the information into the hands of potential clients (for whatever 
they decide it's worth), then having the information available on a Supreme Court 
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provides an increasing amount of information about persons who commit 
criminal conduct.51 It can be argued that such information, if it is free or 
available at a nominal cost, is reasonably discoverable, and therefore the 
exception for facts not reasonably discoverable should not impose a duty to 
speak. 
Other types of information are harder to obtain. For example, it may be 
difficult for a client to determine whether an attorney has been subject to court-
imposed sanctions that are not readily discoverable through computer-based 
technology, such as sanctions imposed by a trial court that did not result in a 
reported decision. The law should not require clients to take burdensome steps 
to learn unusual information about an attorney that materially bears upon the 
representation. 52 There is, however, value to reading narrowly the exception for 
facts not reasonably discoverable. Clients should be encouraged to ask good 
questions of their attorneys and gather information to protect their own interests. 
Presently, too few cases exist dealing with lawyer-client disclosure issues to be 
able to predict with confidence the scope of the exception for facts that are not 
reasonably discoverable. 
3. Facts Within the Scope of a Fiduciary Relationship 
A fiduciary has a duty to disclose relevant information to a beneficiary 
because the fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence imposes a duty to 
speak. 53 Attorney-client relationships are fiduciary as a matter of law.54 
website seems like a good way of hiding it, not making it readily accessible. 
(What is the budget going to be for publicizing this web address? What 
percentage of consumers who need this information are computer-literate?) 
E-mail from W. William Hodes, Professor Emeritus, Indiana University School of Law, 
Indianapolis, to listserv of the Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (Aug. 10, 
2004) (on file with the authors) (used with permission of Professor Hodes). 
51. See, e.g., Net Detective, at http://www.btinternet.coml-chris.heatonldetective/criminal-
record-check.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2004) (offering searches on "criminal and prison records," 
"marriage, property and adoption records," "law suits, court orders and alimony," inter alia, at 
a cost of$29.00 for three years of unlimited searches). But see Lynn Peterson, Navigating the 
Maze of Criminal Records Retrieval - Updated, at http://records.4mg.comlcriminal.htm (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2004) (stating that "[t]here is no such thing as a national criminal records 
check"); Internet for Lawyers - Criminal Records, at http://www.netforlawyers.comlarticle_ 
public_records_03.htm (last visited Oct. 3,2004) (explaining what records are available). 
52. Cf Queen v. Lambert, 577 S.E.2d 72, 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (opining that the 
existence of "a confidential relationship imposes a greater duty on the parties to reveal what 
should be revealed and a lessened duty to discover independently what could have been 
discovered through the exercise of ordinary care"). 
53. See EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 553. 
54. See Keywell Corp. v. Piper & Marbury, L.L.P., No. 96-CV-0660E(SC), 1999 WL 
66700, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 11,1999). 
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Accordingly, it is reasonable to ask whether an attorney's nondisclosure of 
unfavorable infonnation about his credentials or experience will support an 
action for fraud because of the fiduciary nature of the relationship, which 
requires a lawyer to speak. Indeed, of the three main theories for imposing a 
duty to speak (1) facts basic to the transaction,55 (2) facts not reasonably 
discoverable,56 and (3) facts within the scope of a fiduciary relationship - the 
fiduciary-relationship exception is the most troublesome because it is potentially 
the most wide-ranging. Consequently, courts should exercise great care in 
interpreting the meaning of this exception. The question is to what extent this 
exception requires an attorney to disclose adverse facts about credentials or 
experience, even if those facts are not basic to the transaction or are reasonably 
discoverable by the client. 
Some courts have said that attorneys owe clients a duty of "absolute and 
perfect candor."57 The phrase "absolute and perfect candor," however, is an 
overstatement of an attorney's disclosure obligations, for in many contexts the 
law imposes no more than a duty of reasonable care to keep a client infonned of 
relevant matters.58 Still, where the interests of the lawyer and client clearly are 
adverse - as in the case of a business transaction between the two the 
attorney's duty is essentially one of absolute and perfect candor. 59 
A fiduciary never has a duty to reveal immaterial information,60 or 
information that is unreliable61 or already known to the beneficiary.62 Assuming 
55. See supra Part II.A.1. 
56. See supra Part II.A.2. 
57. See Johnson, Candor, supra note 4, at 753-70 (discussing recent cases from Texas, 
California, Oklahoma, and the District of Columbia). 
58. [d. at 775-76 (stating that "non negligent failure to furnish information to a client" will 
not ordinarily give rise to civil liability). 
59. See Holland v. Brown, 66 S.W.2d 1095, 1102 (Tex. App. 1933) (stating that "[tJhe 
failure of an attorney dealing with his client to disclose to him the material facts and the legal 
consequences flowing from the facts constitutes actionable fraud"); see also Cummings v. Sea 
Lion Corp., 924 P.2d 10 II, 1021 (Alaska 1996) (finding an attorney liable for fiduciary fraud 
for failing to disclose to client corporation that the attorney would only be paid if the transaction 
between the corporation and a previous client was successful); Johnson, Candor, supra note 4, 
at 770-78 ("Judicial decisions irrefutably establish that business transactions between lawyer 
and client are presumptively fraudulent. Such dealings will not survive scrutiny unless the 
lawyer proves that the highest standards of disclosure and fair dealing were observed .... In 
such cases ... it is accurate to say that attorneys have a duty of 'absolute and perfect candor. '''). 
60. See, e.g., STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 2002) 
(holding that a law firm did not breach its fiduciary duties by failing to disclose immaterial 
information). 
61. See Johnson, Candor, supra note 4, at 783 (noting that "[uJnreliable information is one 
type of information that may be found to lack materiality"). 
62. See id. at 785-87 (recognizing that "little would be gained by mandating disclosure of 
information already possessed by the client"). 
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that none of these limits apply, suppose, for example, that a client is unaware 
that an attorney has never handled a case of the type for which the client wishes 
to engage representation. The absence of prior experience is not unreliable 
because it is a fact known with certainty to the lawyer. The fact is not known 
to the client. And, the matter is material because even though it might not be the 
decisive consideration, it would logically be given some weight during the 
client's selection of counsel. Must the lawyer disclose to the client the lack of 
prior experience because there is a fiduciary duty to speak? 
Conventional wisdom would say that there is no fiduciary duty to disclose 
adverse information about lack of experience before the attorney-client 
relationship comes into existence.63 Until that moment, the lawyer does not owe 
a prospective client the full range of fiduciary duties that are owed to clients.64 
The lawyer, however, arguably cannot continue to be silent regarding the 
adverse facts once entering into a relationship with a client. While some may 
argue that it is too late to require disclosure of the adverse information because 
the client has already hired the lawyer, this cannot be true for several reasons. 
First, a client may discharge an attorney at any time, with or without cause,65 
subject to liability for unpaid attorney's fees.66 The lawyer's nondisclosure of 
information about lack of experience bears on the client's exercise of the right 
to terminate the engagement. Second, the interests of the lawyer and client are 
arguably adverse - the lawyer would like the relationship to continue, but the 
client, upon learning of the lawyer's lack of experience or credentials, might 
prefer to terminate it. In this situation does the law impose a duty of "absolute 
and perfect candor," the violation of which will subject the lawyer to liability for 
fraud? 
A mechanical reading of fiduciary duty law might lead to the conclusion that 
disclosure of the lack of experience is required. Yet common sense dictates a 
contrary result. It would be absurd to permit a lawyer to not disclose 
unfavorable information before signing a client, but then require the lawyer to 
reveal the information immediately thereafter. Once the attorney-client 
relationship has come into existence, the lawyer should be focused on making 
the relationship work, rather than on revealing prior adverse information that 
63. A potential client inquiring about legal services does not qualify as a client until the 
lawyer consents to provide legal services or knows or should know that the potential client is 
relying on the lawyer to provide legal services. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS, supra note I, § 14(1). 
64. Id. § 15 cmt. b (stating that "prospective clients should receive some but not all of the 
protection afforded clients"). 
65. /d. § 32; see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 9.5.2, at 545 
( 1986) ("It is now uniformly recognized that the client-lawyer contract is terminable at will by 
the cI ient. "). 
66. See RESTATEMENTOFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note I, § 40. 
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might undo the relationship or make it less productive. The attorney's fiduciary 
obligation should be to work as hard as possible to ensure that the representation 
is successful, rather than to reveal negative past infonnation that might induce 
"buyer's remorse." 
Courts should hold that if silence about unfavorable credentials or experience 
was proper before the commencement of the relationship because the facts were 
not basic to the transaction67 or were reasonably discoverable,68 continued 
silence after the relationship begins is ordinarily also acceptable. Thus, the 
focus concerning past infonnation relating to credentials and experience should 
be on whether the attorney acted properly in terms of what was said before the 
initiation of the relationship. This approach is reasonable, provided that no new 
developments in the representation directly call for disclosure of past facts, such 
as a request by the client for infonnation relating to the subject.69 
Fiduciary duty law largely falls within the competence of the courts. Absent 
legislative restrictions, courts are free to shape that body of law in a manner that 
is likely to be most conducive to the common good.70 The recommended rule 
would promote stability in lawyer-client relationships and would also minimize 
the risk that the slightest failure to disclose adverse infonnation, which there was 
originally no duty to reveal, might be inflated into the predicate for a malpractice 
action or a request for fee forfeiture. Lawyers would still remain subject to 
liability for failure to disclose facts basic to the transaction7l and facts not 
67. See supra Part ILA.I. 
68. See supra Part ILA.2. 
69. There may be circumstances short of a direct request that call for disclosure. For 
example, suppose that a client relates to the lawyer a story in the newspaper about 2.n attorney 
who was sanctioned for abusive litigation tactics, and then says, "I sure would not want to be 
represented by ajerk like that." If the client's lawyer has been subject to similar sanctions, the 
lawyer has a duty to disclose those facts to correct the client's known misimpression about a 
material subject. See supra note 24. 
70. In shaping the law of legal malpractice, courts have departed from well-established 
principles where it was sensible to do so. In McPeake v. William T. Cannon. Esq .• 553 A.2d 
439 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), an attorney was sued for malpractice after representing a criminal 
client who jumped to his death from the courthouse window when his guilty verdict was 
returned. The suicide was foreseeable because the client had previously threatened to kill 
himself and thus, under ordinary principles of proximate causation, the client's death was legally 
caused by the attorney's alleged negligence. Id. at 442. However, the court determined that the 
attorney could not be held liable even if the lawyer's negligence had precipitated the suicide 
because to impose such a risk would discourage attorneys from representing "a sizeable number 
of depressed or unstable criminal defendants," and defeat the important goal of making legal 
counsel available to those who need it. Id. at 443. 
71. See supra Part II.A.I (discussing the duty to disclose facts "basic to the transaction"). 
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reasonably discoverable,72 and, as discussed below, for false73 and misleading74 
statements, failure to obtain informed consent,75 and negligent 
misrepresentation.76 
The recommended rule would require a lawyer to provide prior information 
about credentials and experience when that information is requested or directly 
relevant to the representation. This is true because lawyers are under a broadly 
applicable obligation to act reasonably in practicing law. Lawyers must respond 
to legitimate requests for information and must keep clients reasonably informed 
about relevant matters.77 Beyond this duty of reasonable care,78 courts should 
not blindly impose a duty of absolute and perfect candor on attorneys to relate 
information about credentials or experience. A client who hires an attorney has 
no legitimate expectation that the attorney will divulge every unfavorable fact 
relating to the attorney's credentials or experience. Rather, one expects an 
attorney to disclose what is important, to overlook what is not, and to exercise 
reasonable judgment in between. Client expectations are important because 
"[t]he crucial element in determining whether a duty of disclosure exists is 
whether the mistaken party would reasonably expect disclosure."79 
Furthermore, a rule imposing a duty of absolute and perfect candor with 
regard to disclosure of an attorney's credentials and experience would set an 
unattainable standard. Lawyers might never finish reciting the dullest passages 
of their personal histories if the law required "absolute and perfect" disclosure 
of information about credentials or experience.so In addition, the important 
disclosures would be lost amidst the tide of other less-useful information. 
Finally, little would be gained, from the standpoint of imposing legal liability, 
by requiring disclosure of facts so old, unreliable, minor, or immaterial that 
reasonable care would not call for their disclosure. In the end, a plaintiff 
72. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the duty to disclose facts that are "not reasonably 
discoverable"). 
73. See infra Part II.C (discussing liability for outright lies). 
74. See infra Part II.B (discussing liability for potentially misleading statements). 
75. See infra Part I1I.B (discussing liability for failure to obtain informed consent). 
76. See infra Part III.A (discussing liability for negligent misrepresentation). 
77. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS. supra note 1. § 20. 
78. For a fairly characteristic explanation of the disclosure obligations that the law of 
negligence imposes on lawyers. see Sierra Fria Corp. v. Donald 1. Evans, P.e., 127 F.3d 175. 
179-82 (I st Cir. 1997). 
79. Fleming Cos. v. Krist Oil Co .• 324 F. Supp. 2d 933. 946 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (quoting 
Hennig v. Ahearn. 601 N.W.2d 14.22 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999». 
80. But see Lerman. supra note 2. at 683 ("[Ilf lawyers were more candid about the extent 
of their experience and about their own judgment that they could handle work in a new area, the 
flow of business into the law firms might largely be unaffected. The lawyers might 
communicate confidence in their own abilities without lying about their expertise."). 
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alleging fraud or claims based on negligence must prove that the 
misrepresentation caused reliance and damage.81 That will be difficult or 
impossible to show if the facts relating to credentials or experience are so slight 
that reasonable care would not call for revelation. Similarly, nondisclosure of 
such facts will rarely support a claim for fee forfeiture because that remedy is 
normally available only where a breach of fiduciary obligations is a "clear and 
serious violation of a duty.,,82 
The course recommended here for imposing disclosure obligations is 
consistent with decided cases. In a number of instances, courts have been 
reluctant to require professionals to disclose facts about their personal lives or 
information about credentials. A Georgia case, for example, held that a 
physician did not have a duty to disclose his drug-use problems to a patient.83 
In a case in Hawaii,84 a doctor's failure to disclose that he was not a board 
81. See infra Part n.D.2. 
82. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 1, § 37. 
83. See Albany Urology Clinic, P.e. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777 (Ga. 2000). The 
Cleveland court found "compelling public policy reasons that militate against creating an 
independent cause of action for ... a professional's failure to disclose life factors that might be 
detrimental to the rendering of services to patients or c1ients[, including] the impossibility of 
defining which of a professional's life factors would be subject to such a disclosure 
requirement." Id. at 781-82. The court compared the situation in Cleveland to a hypothetical 
situation involving an attorney: 
Consider an attorney who, on most nights, drinks between four and five 
glasses of wine between the time he arrives home from work and the time he 
retires for the evening. He is never intoxicated or hung over at work, and he never 
misses or is late for a work-related event. No one has ever suggested to him, and 
he does not suspect, that his wine drinking affects his professional performance. 
However, his doctor informs him that he may be a "binge drinker," and may have 
a drinking problem .. " Having been so informed, does the attorney have an 
affirmative duty to disclose this life factor - a diagnosed drinking problem which 
conceivably could affect his professional performance - to every current and 
prospective client? If so, does his failure to make such disclosure create a cause 
of action against him regardless of whether his work is competently performed? 
What if the lawyer is aware that his client is opposed to the drinking of alcohol on 
moral or religious grounds, does that create a heightened duty of disclosure on the 
lawyer's part with regard to that particular client? 
[d. at 782 n.19. These questions, the court found, illustrate "the uncertainty that would ensue" 
from a decision requiring disclosure of life factors. [d. However, the court may have reached 
the wrong decision. The facts in Cleveland were egregious. The patient alleged that the 
defendant doctor fraudulently concealed his illegal cocaine use and resulting impairment and 
"negligently performed unnecessary surgery for non-existent penile cancer." [d. at 778-79. An 
argument can be made that the exercise of reasonable care in this case required disclosure by 
the doctor of his illegal drug use. 
84. See Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952 (Haw. 1997). 
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certified plastic surgeon was held not to be a breach of fiduciary duty. 85 These 
cases from the medical field reinforce the conclusion that courts should act 
carefully when defining the disclosure obligations of attorneys. A lawyer 
should be required to reveal adverse facts relating to credentials or experience 
only when a fiduciary is reasonably expected to reveal those facts or special 
circumstances make those facts directly relevant to the representation. 
B. Potentially Misleading Statements 
1. Half-Truths 
Although there may be no duty to speak on the subject of credentials and 
experience, an attorney who elects to do so must be mindful of the rule on half-
truthS.86 A story cannot be told in such a way that it is so incomplete that it 
poses a grave risk of misleading the listener.87 This rule applies with particular 
force to attorneys. Thus, one court stated: 
A person must be able to trust a lawyer's word as the lawyer should 
expect his word to be understood, without having to search for 
equivocation, hidden meanings, deliberate half-truths or 
camouflaged escape hatches.88 
85. The doctor was "certified as, and held himself out to be, an otolaryngologist, facial 
surgeon, and cosmetic surgeon" and "made no active representations to the contrary, nor did he 
conceal his qualifications." ld. at 958. The court stated that "[u]nder the circumstances" the 
physician had no affirmative duty to disclose his qualifications or lack thereof to the patient. 
Id. The court further concluded that because the jury instructions said that the doctor had "an 
affirmative duty to exercise the utmost good faith, integrity, fairness, and fidelity, and to disclose 
material facts to the patient regarding the doctor's qualifications to perform the procedures 
contemplated by the patient," the jury instructions were erroneous. Id. at 959. 
86. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 529 (providing that "[a] representation 
stating the truth so far as it goes but which the maker knows or believes to be materially 
misleading because of his failure to state additional or qualifying matter is a fraudulent 
misrepresentation"); see also Meade v. Cedarapids, Inc., 164 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Gregory v. Novak, 855 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Or. Ct. App. 1993), for the proposition that 
"[ 0 Jne who makes a representation that is misleading because it is in the nature of a half-truth 
assumes the obligation to make a full and fair disclosure of the whole truth") (internal 
quotations and alterations omitted); In re Greene, 620 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Or. 1980); Morales v. 
Morales, 98 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Tex. App. 2003) (stating "when one voluntarily discloses 
information, he has a duty to disclose the whole truth rather than making a partial disclosure that 
conveys a false impression"). 
87. "[OJne who voluntarily elects to make a partial disclosure is deemed to have assumed 
a duty to tell the whole truth ... even though the speaker was under no duty to make the partial 
disclosure in the first place." Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 247 F.3d 
574,584 (5th Cir. 2001). 
88. III re Conduct of Hiller, 694 P.2d 540, 544 (Or. 1985) (holding that an attorney who 
stated that property had been sold, but fai led to disclose the pro forma character of the transfer, 
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For example, a lawyer cannot state that she was awarded a degree by a 
university, without mentioning that the degree was later revoked;89 that she is 
licensed to practice law, without saying that she is now on inactive status;90 or 
that she applied for board certification as a specialist, without indicating that her 
application was rejected.91 
However, something is not a half-truth merely because negative information 
of some sort could be revealed about the speaker that has not yet been disclosed. 
Rather, a half-truth exists, and additional disclosure is required, only when the 
undisclosed facts are so directly related to the initial statement, or so pertinent 
to an understanding of the subject, that the recipient of the initial statement 
would feel seriously misled about that particular assertion of fact. 92 This nexus 
requirement is important, for otherwise, the half-truth rule might be read so 
broadly as to devour both the general rule that countenances silence and the 
exceptions that impose a duty to speak. 
in order to trigger an opponent's repayment obligations under a promissory note, violated a 
disciplinary rule prohibiting misrepresentation). 
89. See generally Bernard D. Reams, Jr., Revocation of Academic Degrees by Colleges and 
Universities, 14 J.e. & U.L. 283, 30 I (1987) (stating that "both public and private universities 
possess the authority to revoke degrees already conferred"). 
90. See In re Conduct of Kumley, 75 P.3d 432, 435 (Or. 2003) (holding that an inactive 
attorney's misconduct in describing himself as an "attorney" on forms that he submitted to two 
state agencies in connection with his candidacy for the state legislature warranted reprimand). 
91. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 529 cmt. a ("[AJ statement by a vendor 
that his title has been upheld by a particular court is a false representation if he fails to disclose 
his knowledge that an appeal from the decision is pending."). 
92. See, e.g., Fid. Mortgage Co. v. Cook, 821 S.W.2d 39,43 (Ark. 1991 ) (imposing liability 
based on failure by a bank to disclose that it lacked the capacity to fund a loan that it had 
committed to make); Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 272-73 
(Cal. 1997) (involving letters of recommendation that cast an administrator in a positive light 
without mentioning prior complaints of his sexual impropriety with students); Kannavos v. 
Annino, 247 N.E.2d 708, 711 (Mass. 1969) (holding that where houses were advertised as 
investment properties and were being rented to the public for multifamily purposes, the vendors 
were bound to disclose to purchasers that multifamily use of the houses violated zoning laws 
because "[aJlthough there may be no duty imposed upon one party to a transaction to speak for 
the information of the other if he does speak with reference to a given point of information, 
voluntarily or at the other's request, he is bound to speak honestly and to divulge all the material 
facts bearing upon the point that lie within his knowledge") (internal alterations and quotations 
omitted); Junius Constr. Corp. v. Cohen, 178 N.E. 672, 674 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, J.) (holding 
that while a vendor of property was under no duty to mention planned streets, having disclosed 
two of them, he was obliged to reveal a third street which, if opened, would divide the plot in 
half); ColumbialHCA Healthcare Corp. v. Couey, 72 S.W.3d 735, 744 (Tex. App. 2002)(stating 
that partial disclosure about a retirement plan was fraudulent because it failed to indicate that 
the plan could be rescinded at any time). 
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2. Opinions, Puffing, State of Mind, and Implicit Statements of Fact 
Some contend that an action for fraud must be based on a misrepresentation 
of fact and that a mere assertion of opinion is an insufficient predicate for legal 
liability. This is an overstatement, however, because in some instances, a 
misleading statement of opinion will suffice as the basis for a fraud action.93 
Not surprisingly, many of the cases falling within this important exception 
involve professionals. If a doctor, lawyer, or other professional knows of the 
misleading nature of her statement of opinion, or acts with reckless indifference 
thereto, a layperson who detrimentally relies may be entitled to sue for damages. 
In sorting out which statements of opinion by lawyers relating to credentials 
or experience may give rise to liability, several distinct rules that have evolved 
from the misrepresentation cases should be considered. These rules concern (1 ) 
puffing, (2) misrepresentation of state of mind, and (3) implicit statements of 
fact. 
Puffing is sales talk, language that casts a rosy glow over a transaction, but 
says nothing specific about the facts.94 Words like "fine," "first-class," and 
"best" are typical examples of puffing. According to a longstanding rule of tort 
law, puffing is permissible.95 This makes good sense. "Puffing" by sellers often 
renders difficult, burdensome, or annoying transactions a bit more pleasant or 
tolerable, and it also greases the wheels of the economy by increasing the 
frequency of commercial exchange. "Puffing" is as important in the legal field 
as any other course of endeavor, for the economic realities of law practice 
cannot be ignored. 
93. Thus, it was written more than a century ago: 
Generally speaking, the representations must be as to a material fact, susceptible 
of knowledge; and, if they appearto be mere matters of opinion or conjecture, they 
are not actionable. There are many cases, however, in which even a false assertion 
of an opinion will amount to a fraud, the reason being that, under the 
circumstances, the other party has a right to rely upon what is stated or 
represented. Thus, the liability may arise where one has or assumes to have 
knowledge upon a subject of which the other is ignorant, and knowingly makes 
false statements, on which the other relies. 
Hedin v. Minneapolis Med. & Surgical Inst., 64 N.W. 158, 159 (Minn. 1895). 
94. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 757 (stating that "sales talk, or 
puffing, ... is considered to be offered and understood as an expression of the seller's opinion 
only, ... on which no reasonable man would rely"). 
95. See Millerv. William ChevroletlGEO, Inc., 762 N.E.2d 1,7 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (stating 
that "[p]uffing is defined as a bare and naked statement as to value of a product and is 
considered a non actionable assertion of opinion") (internal quotations omitted); Prudential Ins. 
Co., v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 163 (Tex. 1995) (stating that representations 
by a vendor that a "building was 'superb,' 'super fine,' and 'one of the finest little properties 
in the City of Austin'" were merely puffing and could not constitute fraud). 
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Impressing prospective clients is a prerequisite to successful 
private law practice .... [L]awyers face considerable pressure to 
bring in new clients. A solo practitioner needs new clients to pay the 
rent and meet the payroll. In large firms, each lawyer must attract 
business in order to become a partner and to earn a share of the 
profits. 
After a client has hired a lawyer or a firm, the problem of making 
a good impression changes. Lawyers must maintain and cultivate 
their clients' initial positive impressions .... 96 
Not surprisingly, lawyers routinely engage in puffing and do not consider it 
improper.97 Like everyone else, attorneys may contend that the glass is half full, 
rather than half empty. As the Second Circuit recently wrote: "It can be 
expected that any professional will convey to potential clients a healthy self-
estimation.,,98 Any theory of liability for attorney misrepresentation of 
credentials or experience must accommodate the rule that says that puffing is 
permissible. However, statements that extend beyond expressing a favorable 
opinion. and instead assert false facts, are actionable. There is an important 
difference between a flattering characterization and a gross exaggeration.99 In 
addition, puffing is subject to at least two important limitations. The first 
concerns state of mind, and the second concerns implicit factual assertions. 
As Lord Bowen famously said, "The state of a man's mind ... is as much a 
fact as the state of his digestion." 100 If a plaintiff can prove that the defendant 
misrepresented his state of mind when uttering an opinion, the defendant may 
be liable. This rule applies to doctors 101 and lawyers,102 as well as other 
96. See Lerman, supra note 2, at 662. 
97. See id. at 721-23. With respect to their expertise, H[m]any lawyers argue that puffing 
is harmless as long as clients do not have to pay for the extra time the lawyer takes to acquire 
expertise" and "do not consider what they characterize as 'puffing' to be lying." Id. at 753. 
98. Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 423 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Griffin v. Fowler, 579 
S.E.2d. 848, 853 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) ("In the absence offalse or grossly misleading statements 
which evidence an intent to create a false impression of expertise or experience, it is not fraud 
for an attorney to convey to a potential client a healthy self-estimation of ability."). 
99. Baker, 239 F.3d at 423 (finding that statements in an attorney's resume went beyond 
puffing and "were either false or grossly misleading, and created the false impression ... of an 
experienced litigator"); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
100. Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, L.R. 29 Ch. Div. 459, 483 (1885). 
101. Cf Hedin v. Minneapolis Med. & Surgical Inst., 64 N.W. 158. 159-60 (Minn. 1895) 
("The doctor. with his skill and ability, should be able to approximate to the truth when giving 
his opinion .... If he ... does not believe the statement true, ... but represents it as true, ... 
it is to be inferred that he intended to deceive .... [A]n action for deceit will lie."). 
102. See Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179, 1184 (N.Y. 
1995) (holding that a law firm stated a claim by alleging that the defendant attorney 
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defendants. 1m Suppose that an attorney says that he has extensive experience in 
a particular area of the law, a good track record in a certain type of case, or 
unbeatable credentials. If the plaintiff can prove that the attorney lacked 
confidence in the facts that the assertion implied, damages may be available. 104 
It will be hard to unearth the needed proof because the attorney will likely claim 
that he believed the statements made. But the discovery process in litigation 
often reveals the unexpected. Business records, correspondence, or statements 
in depositions by colleagues or former employees may supply the evidence the 
plaintiff needs to show misrepresentation of the attorney's state of mind. 
In addition, every statement of opinion carries with it at least two implicit 
statements of fact: first, that the speaker has some factual basis for uttering the 
view expressed, and second, that the facts known to the speaker are not wholly 
inconsistent with the opinion voiced.105 A lawyer cannot say that he is "good at 
oil and gas law," if he knows nothing about the subject, 106 nor can he make that 
claim if he has recently been held liable for malpractice based on incompetence 
in that field. 
An example of an expression of opinion giving rise to an implicit statement 
of fact can be drawn from the medical context. Predictions of success, as mere 
opinions about the future, typically are not actionable. I07 In an early case, 
however, a court stated: 
"represented orally to the partnership that he ... would act to ensure the future of the firm ... 
when he never intended to do so"); Martin v. Ohio State Univ. Found., 742 N.E.2d 1198, 1205 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (stating, in a suit against a lawyer, that misrepresentation of "existing 
mental attitude" is actionable). 
103. Cf Bogle v. Bragg, 548 S.E.2d 396, 400 (Ga. Ct. App. 200 I) (stating, in a case against 
company directors and a corporate attorney, that a claim for fraud cannot lie on representations 
as to future events, "except that fraud may be predicated on a promise made with a present 
intention not to perform"). 
104. In such a case, the defendant's proven lack of confidence in what was said will establish 
both the fact that state of mind was misrepresented and scienter, for one way to prove scienter 
is to show that the maker of the statement did "not have the confidence in the accuracy of his 
representation that he state! d] or implie[d]." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 526(b). 
105. Id. § 539; see also Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Hires Bottling of Chic., 371 F.2d 256, 
258 (7th Cir. 1967). 
106. See, e.g., Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 424 & n.24 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding an 
attorney liable for resume fraud for claiming, among other things, that he acted as "regular 
counsel to public and private companies in connection with regulatory issues under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act," when he had never done any such work). 
107. See Maness v. Reese, 489 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. App. 1972) (stating that "predictions 
and opinions do not serve as a basis for actionable fraud"); PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, 
supra note 3, at 762 (stating that "[o]rdinarily a prediction as to events to occur in the future is 
to be regarded as a statement of opinion only, on which the adverse party has no right to rely"). 
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The plaintiff, an illiterate man, badly injured in an accident ... 
consulted with the physician . . . as to his condition and the 
probability of a recovery. After an examination by the surgeons, he 
was positively assured ... that he could be cured, and by treatment 
at that institute could and would be made sound and well. . . . 
[T]here was something more in defendants' [sic] statements than the 
mere expression of his opinion upon a matter of conjecture and 
uncertainty. It amounted to a representation that plaintiff's physical 
condition was such as to insure a complete recovery. lOS 
Presumably, a similar analysis regarding implied facts may apply in the legal 
field, not only with respect to predictions of future success, but also statements 
of opinions about credentials or experience. 
C. Outright Lies 
Scholars say that "[ d]eception by omission and by commission are morally 
identical: the purpose and the consequences are the same."I09 Yet it is often 
easier to condemn a bold-faced lie, than to censure nondisclosure or decry an 
incomplete statement. Not surprisingly, there are many cases holding attorneys 
liable for deliberately false statements. I 10 Fraudulent entries on a resume'" or 
a website relating to credentials or experience are illustrations. Because honesty 
is highly relevant to job performance by lawyers, a false statement by an 
attorney on a job application about class rank or other academic information will 
often be regarded as material.' '2 
108. Hedin v. Minneapolis Med. & Surgical Inst., 64 N.W. 158, 159-60 (Minn. 1895). The 
court indicated that if the implicit assertion was knowingly false, an action for deceit would lie. 
See id. at 160. 
109. See Lerman, supra note 2, at 663. 
110. See. e.g., McKinnon v. Tibbetts, 440 A.2d 1028, 1029 (Me. 1982) (holding an attorney 
liable for fraud based on falsely assuring a client that he "was pursuing the claim even though 
he was not taking any action"). 
Ill. See Baker, 239 F.3d at 423 (affirming a tinding that an attorney committed fraud where 
representations in the attorney's resume were "either false or grossly misleading, and created 
the false impression [that the attorney was] an experienced litigator"). 
112. See Miller v. Beneficial Mgt. Corp., 855 F. Supp. 691 (D.N.J. 1994). In Miller, the 
plaintifffalsely stated her grade point average, class rank, and other information. Id. at 697 & 
nn.6 & 7. In addressing discrimination issues, the court wrote: 
Resume fraud asserted in support of an after-acquired evidence defense must 
be material, directly related to measuring a candidate for employment, and must 
have been relied t:pon by the employer in making the hiring decision .... 
Miller's misrepresentations, if proven to be intentional, would certainly fulfill 
this standard. As an attorney, and an applicant for ajob as an attorney, Miller was 
required and expected to maintain the highest standard of veracity and integrity. 
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In many instances, the issue is not what constitutes a lie, but whether a 
particular statement was ever made. The issue of whether an attorney previously 
lied about credentials or experience will often tum on conflicting versions of 
what was orally expressed during the commencement or continuance of legal 
representation. The client will testify that the lawyer said one thing, which if 
credited by the jury, will mean that the lawyer lied. The lawyer, in contrast, will 
deny that the statement was ever made. The question of legal liability for fraud 
will hang in the balance. 
D. Other Considerations 
I. Scienter 
Regardless of whether an action for fraud is based on nondisclosure, a 
misleading statement, or an utter falsehood, the plaintiff must prove scienter, a 
particular culpable state of mind. In general, "scienter" is established by 
evidence showing that the defendant acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth.1I3 Section 526 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is 
somewhat more precise. The Restatement provides that a misrepresentation is 
"fraudulent" - that is to say, made with scienter - if the speaker "(a) knows 
or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be, (b) does not have the 
confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he states or implies, or (c) 
knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he states or 
implies." I 14 If there is evidence that a lawyer, with respect to credentials or 
experience, deliberately failed to disclose material information when there was 
a duty to speak, knew that what was uttered was misleading, or intentionally 
falsified the facts, scienter will be established. 
2. Intent to Induce Reliance 
Cases frequently say that to be liable in fraud for damages based on 
misrepresentation, the defendant must not only act with scienter, 115 but also must 
intend to defraud the plaintiff. I 16 This a slight overstatement, however, because 
The Rules of Professional Conduct, in fact, make it professional misconduct for 
a lawyer to inter alia engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation. 
Id. at 710 n.22 (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted). 
113. See RONALD E. MAllEN & JEfFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.10, at 826 (5th 
ed.2000). 
114. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 526. 
115. See supra Part II.D.1. 
116. See Jean v. Tyson-Jean, 118 S.W.3d 1,9 n.9 (Tex. App. 2003) (stating that "[bJecause 
appellant testified there was no 'intention' on the part of [others] to defraud her, actual fraud 
could not have been proved"). 
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expectation of reliance will suffice as a basis for liability, even if the defendant 
does not desire to induce reliance. 117 
Cases in which the defendant misrepresents material facts about credentials 
or experience while dealing directly with the plaintiff pose few problems. The 
dealings between the parties will show that reliance was highly foreseeable to, 
ifnot plainly desired by, the defendant. Difficult questions may arise, however, 
in cases where there are no personal dealings between the parties, and no 
evidence of intent on the part of the defendant for a particular false or 
misleading message to be conveyed to the plaintiff. In these cases, it may be 
useful to differentiate written misrepresentations from oral misrepresentations. 
The Restatement contains a provision addressing written misrepresentations 
"incorporated in [aJ document or otherthing." I 18 According to the commentary, 
"the maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation incorporated in a document has 
reason to expect that it will reach and influence any person whom the document 
reaches.""9 This would seem to suggest that, in cases of resume fraud, anyone 
whom the resume reaches may rely on its contents and sue for damages. One 
might, by analogy, argue that the same rule also applies to misstatements 
incorporated into websites, which are the electronic equivalent to documents. 
However, at least one caveat must be noted. Despite the breadth of the 
Restatement's comment, the blackletter rule is written in tighter terms. The rule 
reads: 
One who embodies a fraudulent misrepresentation in an article of 
commerce, a muniment of title, a negotiable instrument or a similar 
commercial document, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss 
caused to another who deals with him or with a third person 
regarding the article or document in justifiable reliance upon the 
truth of the representation. 120 
Thus, it can be argued that a resume or a website, even if it misrepresents 
credentials or experience, is not a "commercial document" that is "similar" to 
the type of "article of commerce, ... muniment of title, [or] ... negotiable 
instrument" with which the blackletter rule is concerned. 121 
Different problems are posed by oral misrepresentations regarding credentials 
or experience that reach someone other than the intended recipient. The 
117. RESTATEMENTOFToRTS, supra note I, § 531 (stating that liability for fraud extends to 
persons whom the defendant "intends or has reason to expect to act or to refrain from action in 
reliance upon the misrepresentation"). 
118. See id. § 532. 
119. /d. § 532 cmt. b. 
120. [d. § 532. 
121. See id. 
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commentary to the Restatement's general rule on "expectation of influencing 
conduct,,122 states that a general risk of reliance, inherent in virtually every 
misrepresentation, is insufficient for liabiIity.123 Rather: 
The maker of the misrepresentation must have information that 
would lead a reasonable man to conclude that there is an especial 
likelihood that it will reach those persons and will influence their 
conduct .... 124 
In nonattomey contexts, some courts have gone to great lengths to indicate that 
foreseeable reliance is not sufficient to allow a third party to sue for fraud. 125 It 
would not be surprising to see a similarly rigorous standard applied to cases in 
which attorneys are alleged to have misrepresented their credentials or 
experience. In states following the Restatement rule, a plaintiff would have to 
prove that the facts demonstrated an "especial likelihood" that the plaintiff 
would rely upon the misrepresentation. Presumably, liability would be imposed 
only in instances where the lawyer knew or had a particular reason to foresee 
that the misrepresentation of credentials or experience would reach the plaintiff, 
who would rely thereon. 
3. Reliance, Causation, and Damages 
A cause of action for fraud protects the plaintiff s decision-making process 
from being infected by false, misleading, or incomplete information. No harm 
is caused by a misrepresentation, however, unless the plaintiff relies. 
Accordingly, in every fraud action the plaintiff must prove both reliance l26 and 
that reliance caused damages. 127 
It may be difficult to establish reliance on a misrepresentation in cases where 
the client is sophisticated about business matters or has other legal counsel, for 
122. Id.§531. 
123. Id. § 531 cm!. d. 
124. Id. 
125. See Ernst & Young. L.L.P. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. 2001) 
(embracing a reason-to-expect-reliance standard that requires more than foreseeability). 
126. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Venrock Assocs .. 348 F.3d 584, 592 (7th Cir. 2003); see also 
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 474. at 1358 (2000). 
127. See, e.g., Area Landscaping, L.L.c. v. Glaxo-Wellcome, Inc., 586 S.E.2d 507, 512 
(N.C. C!. App. 2003). Of course, dishonest conduct causes other harm beyond the forms of 
damage that are legally cognizable in an action for fraud. See Lerman, supra note 2, at 679-84 
(discussing the harm caused by lawyer deception of clients, including professional harm to the 
reputation of individual lawyers and the bar as a whole, damage to lawyers' internal standards 
of integrity . perpetuation of hidden errors, damage to the lawyer-client relationship, and damage 
to relationships between lawyers). 
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in such cases, it is less likely that the client was in fact misled. I :!& Of course, 
client sophistication or access to legal counsel are only two considerations in 
assessing whether reliance occurred; there are many others. In particular, if the 
plaintiff knew of the falsity of the representation l29 or the existence of the 
undisclosed fact 130 before making the decision in question, reliance cannot be 
proved. Thus, if a client knows that a lawyer's assertion about experience or 
credentials is false, an action for fraud will not be successful. 
In addition, if there are "danger signals" that would cause a reasonable person 
to inquire,131 and the plaintiff fails to do so, the plaintiff may be estopped from 
claiming reliance.132 However, if there is nothing to cause the plaintiff to 
distrust the defendant's claims other than the defendant's self-interest, the 
plaintiff typically may accept the defendant's affirmative statements at face 
value and need not conduct an investigation to determine whether they are 
true. 133 "[TJhe victim of a misrepresentation has no duty to investigate the 
128. See Coastal Bank SSB v. Chase Bank, N.A., 135 S.W.3d 840, 842-43 (Tex. App. 2004) 
(In addressing communications between two banks, the court noted that "[tJhis was an arm's 
length transaction between two sophisticated financial institutions who were both represented 
by counsel. While such a relationship is not, standing alone, dispositive of the issue of reliance, 
it is a factor to be considered."); see also Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 657 A.2d 
212, 222 (Conn. 1995) (holding that reliance was not assumed in communications between 
sophisticated commercial parties, but was a question of fact). 
129. See Richter v. Wagner Oil Co., 90 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. App. 2002) (stating in the 
context of business litigation that a party who has learned that a representation is false cannot 
rely upon it and then sue). 
130. See Miller v. Kennedy & Minshew. P.c., 142 S.W.3d 325,343-44 (Tex. App. 2003) 
(holding that where client discovered facts allegedly withheld by the attorney, yet continued the 
representation, the law firm was not prevented from collecting its contingent fee by reason of 
having engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct). 
131. Typically, a client will have less reason to investigate the facts when dealing with a 
lawyer than when dealing with another person in an arm's length relationship. See Willis v. 
Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642,645 (Tex. 1988) ("As a fiduciary, an attorney is obligated to render 
a full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client's representation. The cl ient must feel free 
to rely on his attorney's advice. Facts which might ordinarily require investigation likely may 
not excite suspicion where a fiduciary relationship is involved.") (internal citations omitted). 
132. See Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 Oth Cir. 1987). In Greycas, the defendant 
required a loan applicant to supply an attorney's opinion letter containing assurances that there 
were no prior liens on the equipment that was to serve as security. Id. at 1562. The court held 
that the defendant finance company could rely upon the attorney's assurances, even though it 
would not have been hard for it to conduct its own UCC lien search. ld. at 1566. If, however, 
the opinion letter had disclosed that the attorney was the loan applicant's brother-in-law, that 
"might have been a warning signal that [the finance company] could ignore only at its peril" and 
that "[tJo go forward in the face of a known danger is to assume the risk." Id. 
133. See Judd v. Walker, 114 S.W. 979, 981 (Mo. 1908) (stating that the plaintiff could rely 
upon the defendant's definite statement as to the acreage of land and was not required to 
measure the property himself because one need not deal "with [one's] fellow man as if he was 
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truthfulness of the deceit .... "134 This rule is particularly applicable where the 
party making the statement is a lawyer, a person professionally bound to avoid 
conduct involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."135 For 
example, in a case involving an attorney's false statement to opposing counsel 
during settlement negotiations about the amount of insurance coverage that was 
available, the Indiana Supreme Court stated: 
We decline to require attorneys to burden unnecessarily the courts 
and litigation process with discovery to verify the truthfulness of 
material representations made by opposing counsel. The reliability 
of lawyers' representations is an integral component of the fair and 
efficient administration of justice. The law should promote lawyers' 
care in making statements that are accurate and trustworthy and 
should foster the reliance upon such statements by others. 136 
Consequently, a lawyer who lies about credentials ordinarily will not be 
permitted to argue that a client or prospective client should not have trusted the 
lawyer's representations. 
With regard to proving that a misrepresentation about credentials or 
experience caused damage, a recent Texas case from the medical field l37 is 
instructive. In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-physician had 
fraudulently induced him to consent to surgery by telling him that he had 
performed arthroscopy on football star Troy Aikman when, in actuality, he had 
never performed arthroscopy on anyone. 138 The appellate court held that even 
if the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff s claim for fraud, the error was 
harmless because the plaintiff failed to show that the physician was negligent in 
performing patient's surgery or in caring for him thereafter, and thus, the alleged 
misrepresentation did not injure the plaintiff. 139 
In the context of an attorney's misrepresentation of credentials or experience, 
there may be difficult questions regarding what the plaintiff must prove by way 
of actionable harm. If the lawyer was engaged to conduct litigation, some courts 
may require the plaintiff to show that, "but for" the misrepresentation, the case 
a thief or a robber"). 
134. Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, No. CVOl0086006S, 2003 WL 22080469, at *4 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2003). 
135. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2002). 
136. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Bell, 643 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ind. 1994). 
137. See Byington v. Mize, No. 05-00-00786-CV, 2002 WL 1494219 (Tex. App. July IS, 
2002) (involving claims for fraudulent inducement, constructive fraud, and negligent 
misrepresentation). 
138. [d. at **3-4. 
139. [d. at *4 (stating that "Byington can identify no injury he experienced at Dr. Mize's 
hands, even if he were misled as to the doctor's experience"). 
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would not have been lost. 140 However, in cases involving transactional work, 
and perhaps in other contexts, it may suffice to establish that the attorney's 
default caused the loss of an advantageous opportunity.'41 There are cases that 
suggest that demonstrating that the defendant's error made everything more 
difficult or expensive will be enough to prove that a breach of duty caused 
damage. 142 
4. Nonclients 
Fraud is readily actionable by third parties, even in cases where the defendant 
is an attorney. Thus, 
If an attorney commits actual fraud in his dealings with a third party, 
the fact he did so in the capacity of attorney for a client does not 
relieve himofliability .... While an attorney's professional duty of 
care extends only to his own client and intended beneficiaries of his 
legal work, the limitations on liability for negligence do not apply to 
liability for fraud. 143 
Consequently, false statements about credentials or experience made to a 
prospective client who detrimentally relies thereon are likely to support a cause 
of action for fraud, if the other requirements of the action are met. As discussed 
below,'44 however, the same is not true in an action for negligent 
misrepresentation. In actions based on negligence, rather than fraud, the scope 
of liability is more tightly limited because the defendant has acted with less 
culpability. 
5. Privacy Interests of the Attorney 
In some contexts, the duty that an attorney has to disclose to a client facts 
relating to credentials or experience may be offset by the attorney's privacy 
140. Cf Orrick Herrington & Sutcliff, L.L.P. v. Super. Ct., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 659 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2003) (stating that if legal malpractice claim asserts negligent prosecution or defense, 
a case-within-a-case method should be employed). 
141. Cf Viner v. Sweet, 70 P.3d 1046, 1050 (Cal. 2003) (stating that, in a case involving 
legal work relating to the sale of a business, plaintiffs were required to show that but for the 
defendant's negligence "(I) they would have had a more advantageous agreement (the 'better 
deal' scenario), or (2) they would not have entered into the transaction ... and therefore would 
have been better off (the 'no deal' scenario)"). 
142. See Vahila v. Hall, 674 N.E.2d 1164, 1169 (Ohio 1997) (noting that a "strict 'but for' 
test" for causation tends to overprotect errant attorneys and require the introduction of "remote 
and speculative" evidence). 
143. Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
144. See infra Part lILA. 
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interests. Consider, for example, the case of an attorney who earned low grades 
in the relevant law school course. Federal law has set up an elaborate array of 
statutory and regulatory provisions preventing unauthorized disclosure of 
academic information. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 
(FERPA)145 broadly bans educational institutions from releasing educational 
records of present or former students. 146 While the lawyer to whom the records 
relate may consent to release of that information,147 courts should not lightly 
force attorneys to surrender their educational privacy rights. 
Similarly, many students receive testing accommodations under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),148 which requires educational 
institutions to protect the confidentiality of related information. 149 Attorneys 
who receive accommodations in law school may not need to disclose that 
information to clients, 150 although the issue has not yet been resolved by the 
judiciary. Courts should tread carefully in these and related areas, where 
recognition of broad common law obligations might threaten to disrupt or defeat 
federal legislative policy. 
lll. Negligence 
Although fraud provides a framework for balancing the competing interests 
of attorneys and clients in cases involving alleged misrepresentation of 
credentials or experience, fraud is not the only viable avenue for relief of 
aggrieved clients. Clients who are harmed by an attorney's misrepresentation 
of credentials or experience may also seek redress under the law of negligence 
by suing for negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to obtain informed 
consent. 
145. 20 U.S.c. § 1232g (2000). 
146. See generally Dixie Snow Huefner & Lynn M. Daggett, FERPA Update: Balancing 
Access to and Privacy of Student Records, 152 Eouc. L. REP. 469 (200 I). 
147. See Margaret L. O'Donnell, FERPA: Ollly Olle Piece of the Privacy Puzzle, 29 J.c. & 
U.L. 679, 686 (2003) (stating that, under FERPA, "[alII education records are confidential and 
cannot be disclosed unless the student consents or the disclosure fits one of the exceptions"). 
148. See generally Donald H. Stone, What Law Schools Are Doing to Accommodate 
Students with Learning Disabilities, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 19 (2000). 
149. Under the ADA, educational institutions are required to provide an array of special 
accommodations for students with learning disabilities, including, for example, extra time to 
complete exams. See id. at 26. 
150. Compare Frances A. McMorris,Aspiring Lawyer with Dyslexia Gets Test Access, WAlL 
ST. J., July 18, 1997, at B I (opining that "lawyers aren't required to disclose their disabilities 
to clients"), with Scott Lemond & David Mizgala, Identifying and Accommodating the Learning 
Disabled Lawyer, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 69, 90 (2000) (stating that "[illlness or disability ... 
cannot serve as a shield to liability for failure to comport with rules of professional conduct"). 
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A claim for negligence is often preferable to one based on intentional 
wrongdoing 15 1 because it is usually easier to impose vicarious liability,152 or 
reach insurance proceeds,153 when the action is for lack of care, as opposed to 
intentional harm. If the defendant's lack of care is egregious and constitutes 
gross negligence or recklessness, rather than ordinary negligence, the plaintiff 
may also recover the type of exemplary damages that are available in an action 
for fraud. J54 Suing for negligence, rather than fraud, also avoids the stringent 
requirements for pleading and proof that are often applicable to fraud actions. 155 
Thus, there are several good reasons for plaintiffs to frame misrepresentations 
by attorneys about credentials or experience as negligence claims, rather than as 
actions for fraud. 
Disadvantages, however, do exist for negligence actions. One possible 
disadvantage of suing for negligence rather than fraud concerns defenses. 
Contributory negligence is a defense in any action based on lack of care. 
151. See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, Transferred Intent in American Ton Law, 87 MARQ. L. 
REV. 903, 908-09 (2004) (arguing that "the transferred-intent doctrine serves little useful 
purpose with respect to third parties [who suffer accidental injury], for actions based on lack of 
care typically provide plaintiffs with a better route to recovery"). 
152. Cf Medlin v. Bass, 398 S.E.2d 460, 464 (N.C. 1990) (stating in a sexual assault action 
that "intentional tortious acts are rarely considered to be within the scope of an employee's 
employment") (quoting Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 378 S.E.2d 232, 235 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1989)). 
153. See 7 A JOHN A. ApPLEMAN ET AL., INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4501.09, at 267 
(Supp. 2003) (indicating that "[i]ntentional injuries, generally, are not covered"). Proof of 
negligence may also avoid an exclusion from coverage for fraudulent or dishonest conduct. See 
II LEE R. Russ, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 161.19 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter COUCH ON 
INSURANCE] (For negligence to constitute fraud, "there must be more than mere negligence, 
done with an honest intent. Stated otherwise, there must be something more than negligence, 
mistake, carelessness, errors in judgment, inattention to business, or incompetence in order to 
satisfy the definition of dishonesty .... "). 
154. For example, in Texas, gross negligence will support an award of punitive damages. 
See TEX. Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.003 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2004) (stating that 
"exemplary damages may be awarded only if the claimant proves by clear and convincing 
evidence that the harm with respect to which the claimant seeks recovery of exemplary damages 
results from: (I) fraud; (2) malice; or (3) gross negligence"). 
155. FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b) (requiring a complaint alleging fraud to state "the circumstances 
constituting fraud ... with particularity"). Many states have a similar requirement. See, e.g., 
Hills Transp. Co. v. S.W. Forest, 72 Cal. Rptr. 441, 444 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) ("It is well 
established that the pleading of fraud and deceit must be specific .... "). Most states also 
provide that the burden of persuasion with respect to fraud is higher than the ordinary 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard. See Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 487 
(Conn. 1991) (indicating that "numerous courts have stated that a heightened burden of proof 
applies to all the elements of the cause of action for fraud, including damages," but holding that 
a "clear and satisfactory evidence" standard applied to all elements of fraud, except damages, 
which required only a preponderance of the evidence). 
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Consequently, if the plaintiffs reliance on a negligent misrepresentation was 
unreasonable, such carelessness on the part of the plaintiff, in most states, 156 will 
reduce or preclude recovery based on applicable principles of comparative 
negligence l57 or comparative fault. 158 In contrast, negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff is almost never a defense to intentional torts, and therefore cannot be 
raised in most fraud actions. 159 
A. Negligent Misrepresentation 
There is authority from the medical field that misrepresentation of experience 
is actionable as a form of negligent misrepresentation. 160 The central landmark 
156. The District of Columbia and four states have not adopted comparative negligence or 
comparative fault and still retain strict common law contributory negligence, which makes 
unreasonable conduct by the plaintiff a total bar to any action based on negligence. See Bergob 
v. Scrushy. 855 So. 2d 523 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (stating Alabama law); Wingfield v. Peoples 
Drug Store. Inc .• 379 A.2d 685 (D.C. 1977) (stating District of Columbia law); Pippin v. 
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 132 F. Supp. 2d 379 (D. Md. 2001) (stating Maryland law); Yancey 
v. Lea, 532 S.E.2d 560 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (stating North Carolina law); Litchford v. 
Hancock, 352 S.E.2d 335 (Va. 1987) (stating Virginia law). 
157. There are two basic regimes for comparative negligence, "pure" and "modified." Under 
pure comparative negligence, a contributorily negligent plaintiff is not barred from recovery, 
but damages are reduced in proportion to the plaintiffs lack of care. Under modified 
comparative negligence, there is typically a 50% threshold. If the plaintiffs contributory 
negligence exceeds (or, in some jurisdictions. equals) 50% of the total negligence, there can be 
no recovery. If the plaintiff s contributory negligence is below 50%, the plaintiff can recover 
proportionally reduced damages. See generally DOBBS, supra note 126, § 20\. 
158. Under comparative fault, contributory negligence may be invoked to offset liability for 
recklessness or strict liability. as well as liability for negligence, on either a pure or a modified 
basis. See, e.g., UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT §§ 1-2 (2003). 
159. It is arguable that negligence on the part of the plaintiff cannot even be used as a 
defense in a fraud action based on recklessness, rather than intentionally tortious conduct: 
It is usually assumed in discussions of deterrence as a goal of tort law that 
what is to be deterred is specific misbehavior like driving too fast or lying to 
potential buyers. In fraud cases, however, it may be useful to regard the 
appropriate deterrence as being deterrence of making a living by looking for 
gullible people with whom to deal. There is no social utility in seeking out 
potential customers who are too ignorant or foolish to realize that they are being 
cheated. Therefore. "unreasonable" behavior by the victim of a fraud should not 
be. and is not, a defense; the point of this body of law is precisely to deter the 
defendant from seeking out that kind of buyer. In ordinary negligence cases, the 
injured person's negligence may well be a defense (at least in part) because 
carelessness on the part of victims, as well as injurers, should be deterred. and 
because it becomes harder to say that the injurer was negligent if the victim 
messed up badly. But in deceit cases, gullibility of the injured person is more like 
an element of the tort than a defense. 
VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, TEACHING TORTS 295-96 (2d ed. 1999). 
160. See, e.g., Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907 (Colo. 1982). In Bloskas, the court extended 
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in the law of negligent misrepresentation is Section 552 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. Section 552 provides: 
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or 
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary 
interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their 
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused 
to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails 
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or 
communicating the information. 161 
Under this section or similar rules of law, attorneys have been held liable for 
making negligent misstatements that resulted in economic harm to clients and 
third parties. 162 The utterance of a statement may be negligent, even if the 
speaker has an honest belief in its truth, because of lack of reasonable care in 
verifying the facts, or lack of ordinary skill or competence typical of the 
particular calling. 163 
There is an important question, not definitively resolved, about whether 
silence can form the basis for a negligent-misrepresentation action or whether 
there must be some type of affirmative misstatement. Suppose, for example, 
that an attorney negligently fails to disclose adverse material information about 
credentials or experience, which other principles oflaw, such as the rules about 
facts basic to the transaction 164 or facts not reasonably discoverable,165 create a 
duty to reveal. Can the attorney be sued for negligent misrepresentation? Or are 
the doctrine of negligent misrepresentation to representations made in the course of the doctor-
patient relationship because it found "no reason to deny relief when a physician negligently 
conveys false information to the patient, and the patient relies upon the information to his 
physical harm." Id. at 914-15. Interestingly, the action in Bloskas may have properly been one 
for deceit, rather than negligent misrepresentation. The court noted that the doctor "told Mr. 
Bloskas that he, as a member of his medical group, had participated in ankle replacement 
surgery when in fact he had never previously performed such an operation." Id. at 915. 
Presumably, the doctor knew whether he did, or did not, participate in such an operation. The 
plaintiff may have been attempting to underplead the case as negligent misrepresentation rather 
than fraud to reach insurance proceeds. See Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional 
Harm and the Questfor Insurance Funding, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1721 (1997) (discussing attempts 
to establish negligence in cases involving intentional harm). 
161. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 552. 
162. See gellerally Nanneska N. Hazel, Depellding Upon the Care of Strangers: 
Professiollals' Duty to Third Parties for Negligent Misrepresentation, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 
1073 (2002). 
163. See Martin v. Ohio State Univ. Found., 742 N.E.2d 1198, 1209 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000). 
164. See supra Part I1.A.I. 
165. See supra Part I1.A.2. 
2004] MISREPRESENTATION BY LA WYERS 565 
the rules of negligent misrepresentation applicable only if there has been some 
type of false or misleading statement, as opposed to mere silence? 
When the Restatement speaks of liability for negligently "supply[ing] false 
information,"'66 it seems to suggest that there must be an affIrmative 
misstatement. '67 Certain cases can be read to support this view. '68 Other cases, 
however, have expressly held that for purposes of liability for negligent 
misrepresentation, there is no difference between misleading silence and a false 
or misleading statement. 169 Depending upon the view applicable in the relevant 
jurisdiction, a large range of cases - those involving nondisclosure of material 
information about credentials and experience - may be actionable under this 
theory of recovery. 170 
The scope of liability for economic harm resulting from negligent 
misrepresentation l7l is more limited than the scope of liability for fraud. 172 In 
166. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 552(1). 
167. The text of the Restatement is unclear. Section 551 says: 
One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce 
the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the 
same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the 
matter that he has failed to disclose .... 
See id. § 551. The use of the word "knows" (rather than, for example, the phrase "should 
know") arguably suggests that the stated rule applies only to cases involving scienter, not 
negligent misrepresentation. But section 551 appears before section 552 on negligent 
misrepresentation, so perhaps in endorsing section 551, the American Law Institute was not 
addressing whether the same rule applies in cases of negligent misrepresentation. 
168. See, e.g., Martin, 742 N.E.2d at 1209 ("A negligent misrepresentation claim does not 
lie for omissions: there must be an affirmative false statement."); McCamish, Martin, Brown & 
Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1999). 
169. See, e.g., In re Agrobiotech, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1192 (D. Nev. 2003) 
(,'Pursuant to § 551, silence about material facts basic to the transaction, when combined with 
a duty to speak, is the functional equivalent of a misrepresentation or 'supplying false 
information' under Restatement § 552."); see also Roberts v. Ball. Hunt, Hart, Brown & 
Baerwitz. 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 906 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that attorneys could be held 
liable for negligent misrepresentation based on failure to disclose doubts about a partnership'S 
status as a general partnership). 
170. Cf Armstrong v. Hrabal, 87 P.3d 1226, 1244 (Wyo. 2004) (holding that plaintiff could 
not amend the complaint to add a "negligent misrepresentation" claim against an emergency 
room physician, based on the physician's alleged failure to disclose a prior lawsuit against her, 
because plaintiff had not "distinguished between the torts of negligent misrepresentation and 
nondisclosure" and had "not adequately advocated for the adoption of the latter tort"). 
171. See Martha H. West Trust v. Mkt. Value of Atlanta, Inc., 584 S.E.2d 688, 691 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2003) (noting that absent privity, physical harm, willfulness, or property damage, liability 
will not extend to all foreseeable victims). 
172. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note L § 552 cmt. a (stating that liability for 
negligent misrepresentation is narrower than that for fraudulent misrepresentation). "When 
there is no intent to deceive but only good faith coupled with negligence, the fault of the maker 
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some cases, the plaintiff may be unable to show a sufficiently close connection 
to the attorney to state a cause of action. A client or potential client who directly 
receives negligently false information from a lawyer about his credentials or 
experience stands in a better position to sue than one who receives that 
infonnation indirectly. Yet there are many persons within the latter class. A 
lawyer's statements about credentials or experience often circulate through the 
community or are transmitted indirectly to potential plaintiffs by intennediaries. 
If the lawyer who has allegedly engaged in negligent misrepresentation has not 
dealt directly with the party who relies on the false infonnation, there is a 
difficult question regarding whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages. 
If precedent from the accounting cases l73 is followed in suits against lawyers, 
there will likely be three different views. First, courts using the New York view 
will require privity or a relationship akin to privitj.'74 Under this view, unless 
the negligently erroneous infonnation about credentials or experience was 
of the misrepresentation is sufficiently less to justify a narrower responsibility for its 
consequences." ld. 
173. The leading opinion on whether accountants are liable to third parties for negligent 
misrepresentation is still Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,444 (N. Y. 1931), in which 
the court refused to hold accountants liable "in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate 
time to an indeterminate class." More recently, the California Supreme Court summarized the 
complex state of the law as follows: 
A substantial number of jurisdictions follow the lead of Chief Judge Cardozo's 
1931 opinion for the New York Court of Appeals in Ultra mares by denying 
recovery to third parties for auditor negligence in the absence of a third party 
relationship to the auditor that is "akin to privity." In contrast, a handful of 
jurisdictions, spurred by law review commentary, have recently allowed recovery 
based on auditor negligence to third parties whose reliance on the audit report was 
"foreseeable. " 
Most jurisdictions ... have steered a middle course based in varying degrees 
on Restatement Second o/Torts section 552, which generally imposes liability on 
suppliers of commercial information to third persons who are intended 
beneficiaries of the information. 
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 752 (Cal. 1992) (internal citations omitted) 
(overruling lower court decisions which had followed a foreseeability approach and endorsing 
the Restatement position). 
174. See Goldfine v. DeEsso, 766 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (holding that 
a third-party negligent misrepresentation action against an attorney failed because the evidence 
did not prove actual privity or a relationship that approached privity); Prudential Ins. Co. v. 
Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 590 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) 
(relying on precedent from cases relating to accountants in holding that the relationship between 
a lender and a borrower's law firm was sufficiently close to support liability for negligent 
misrepresentation); Hedges v. Durrance, 834 A.2d I, 5 (VI. 2003) (stating that "in order to 
sustain a cause of action against an attorney for negligent misrepresentation, a third party must 
demonstrate a relationship so close as to approach that of privity") (internal quotations omitted). 
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provided directly to the plaintiff by the defendant,175 or was transmitted to the 
plaintiff through a third party under circumstances where the plaintiff was the 
"end and aim of the transaction," 1 76 the plaintiffs suit will likely fail. Second. 
some courts will embrace a foreseeability view. Under this approach, a plaintiff 
who relies on negligently false information about a lawyer's credentials or 
experience will only be permitted to recover if the plaintiffs reliance was 
foreseeable to the defendant. Finally, some courts will embrace the Restatemenr 
position, which requires more than mere foreseeability but less than privity or 
its functional equivalent. 177 Under the Restatement approach, a plaintiff who 
relies upon negligently false information about a lawyer's credentials or 
experience may recover for resulting economic harm only if the plaintiff was 
one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit the information was 
supplied. Case law is already beginning to reflect these and other variations in 
the rules governing attorneys' liability for negligent misrepresentation to 
persons who do not deal with them directly. 178 
Actions for negligent misrepresentation share some of the same requirements 
that are applicable in actions for fraud. Among other things, the plaintiff must 
establish reliance on the misrepresentation179 and that the reliance caused 
175. See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 445 (N.Y. 
1985) (finding that direct communications between a lender and a borrower's accountant 
sufficiently approached privity to support an action for negligent misrepresentation). 
176. Cf Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 275 (N.Y. 1922) (Cardozo, J.) (holding that a 
weigher hired by the seller of beans was liable to the buyer for negligence because the buyer's 
reliance on the statement of weight was the "end and aim of the transaction"); La Salle Nat'l 
Bank v. Ernst & Young L.L.P., 729 N.Y.S.2d 671, 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (finding that a 
returned telephone call was not sufficient linkage to support an action for negligent 
misrepresentation). 
177. According to the Restatement, liability for negligent misrepresentation is ordinarily 
limited to losses suffered: 
(al by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and 
guidance ... [the maker of the statement] intends to supply the information or 
knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and 
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to 
influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar 
transaction. 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note I, § 552(2). 
178. See B.L.M. v. Sabo & Deitsch, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding 
that a developer failed to sufficiently allege that a law firm, which acted as special counsel for 
a city and as bond counsel for a construction project, intended to induce the developer's reliance 
on its representations); Lord v. Parisi, 19 P.3d 358, 363 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that a 
nonclient may recover on a negligent misrepresentation claim against an attorney if there is 
proof of a "special relationship, in which the party sought to be held I iable had some obligation 
to pursue the interests of the other party") (internal quotations omitted). 
179. See Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. Cent. Bank of Denver. N.A., 892 P.2d 230, 
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damage. One should expect that the scope of liability for negligence will not 
extend as far as in an action for fraud, for it is less culpable. Because that is 
true, imposing broad liability risks running afoul of the proportionality principle. 
which holds that liability should be proportional to fault. This public policy 
principle may affect the course of litigation in many ways. In particular, the 
proportionality principle may indirectly influence judicial determinations 
regarding what evidence on damages is admissible, how the jury instructions 
should be stated, and whether ajury verdict is subject to challenge on the ground 
that it is excessive. 
B. Lack of Informed Consent 
Legal malpractice policies often exclude coverage for harm resulting from 
dishonest or fraudulent conduct. '80 Consequently, there may be value to 
characterizing misleading assertions or nondisclosures relating to experience or 
credentials as something other than misrepresentation. An action for negligent 
failure to obtain informed consent offers one option for framing a case in a way 
that minimizes the issue of dishonesty and therefore the risk of triggering an 
exclusion from coverage. 
In the medical context, a doctor has a duty to disclose the material risks of, 
and the alternatives to, a proposed course of treatment. 181 Failure to obtain 
informed consent is a form of negligence, even if the doctor otherwise acts 
carefully in rendering professional services. Recent case law from the medical 
field provides useful guidance about how misrepresentation of information 
regarding credentials or experience might be treated as a violation of the 
professional duty to secure informed consent from a patient or a client. 
In Howard v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey,182 the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey considered "what causes of action will lie when 
a plaintiff contends that a physician misrepl esented his credentials and 
238 (Colo. 1995) (stating, in an action by a bank against a town's attorneys. that "[r]eliance is 
a necessary element of a claim for negligent misrepresentation"). 
180. See 9 COUCH ON INSURANCE. supra note 153. § 131:21 (slating that "[a]ttorneys 
professional liability insurance policies frequently exclude from coverage any dishonest. 
fraudulent. criminal or malicious act or omission") (internal quotations omitted). 
181. See generall.'>' Laurel R. Hanson. Note, Informed Consent and the Scope (~f ([ 
Physician '.I' Duty of Disclosure. 77 N.D. L. REV. 71,71 (2001) (exploring the nature of "what 
a physician must tell a patient in order to achieve full disclosure"); see also DOBBS. supra note 
126. at 653 (stating that "patients are entitled to information about the risks of ... the 
procedure. its necessity. and alternative procedures that might be preferable"); (f Grant H. 
Morris. Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARlZ. L. REV. 313, 315 (2002) 
(stating that while "[i]n the latter half of the twentieth century, the legal requirement of informed 
consent became well-established in all fifty states," as a practical reality, "it did not"). 
182. 800 A.2d 73 (N.J. 2002). ~ 
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experience at the time he obtained the plaintiff's consent to surgery."183 In 
Howard, the plaintiff husband and wife alleged that the defendant neurosurgeon 
had falsely represented that he was board certified and had "performed 
approximately sixty corpectomies in each of the eleven years he had been 
performing such surgical procedures." 184 The wife "was opposed to the surgery 
and it was only after [the doctor's] specific claims of skill and experience that 
she and her husband decided to go ahead with the procedure." 185 
The court held that misrepresentations about a physician's credentials and 
experience supported a claim for lack of informed consent, but not "a separate 
and distinct claim based on fraud.,,186 The court failed to explain why a claim 
for fraud was unavailable,187 but concluded that it was "not convinced that ... 
a novel fraud or deceit-based cause of action" was necessary where such claim 
"would admit of the possibility of punitive damages, and ... circumvent the 
requirements for proof of both causation and damages imposed in a traditional 
informed consent setting."188 The court was "especially reluctant" to extend the 
law because "plaintiff'S damages from this alleged 'fraud' [arose] exclusively 
from the doctor-patient relationship .... "189 
The alleged fault of the defendant in Howard was outright lying, not simply 
nondisclosure. Why the court was concerned that punitive damages would be 
imposed if outright lying was proved is unclear. In addition, it is far from 
apparent why an action for fraud "would circumvent the requirements for proof 
of both causation and damages imposed in a traditional informed consent 
setting."I90 Causation and damages are elements of an action for fraud. 191 The 
183. /d. at 75. 
184. [d. at 76. 
185. Jd. 
186. ld. at 77. 
187. The court merely noted: 
Few jurisdictions have confronted the question of what cause of action should 
lie when a doctor allegedly misrepresents his credentials or experience .... 
Although some suggest that a claim based in fraud may be appropriate if a doctor 
actively misrepresents his or her background or credentials, we are aware of no 
court that has so held. 
/d. at 81-82. 
188. ld. at 82. 
189. ld. 
190. See id. 
191. See, e.g., Dresser-Rand Co. v. Virtual Automation Inc., 361 F.3d 831, 843 (5th Cir. 
2004) ("Among the essential elements of fraud is a showing of injury suffered because of the 
fraud."); Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) 
(defining the elements of fraud as "(1) representation; (2) falsity; (3) knowledge offalsity; (4) 
intent to deceive; and (5) reliance and resulting damage (causation)"); Viguers v. Philip Morris 
USA, Inc., 837 A.2d 534, 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (stating that causation of damage is an 
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court's reluctance to entertain a fraud claim arising exclusively from a doctor-
patient relationship is puzzling. 191 The case involved alleged lying in the course 
of afiduciary relationship. The one case cited by the court sheds little light on 
its reluctance to permit a claim for fraud. 193 One would have expected the court 
to announce that deceit actively practiced on a patient by a physician is 
intolerable, and that outright lying about credentials or experience is actionable 
fraud. Perhaps the court was only trying to ensure that a judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff would be covered by the defendant's malpractice insurance, which 
would cover negligence but not fraudulent conduct. 
On the subject of informed consent, the Howard court held that "significant 
misrepresentations concerning a physician's qualifications can affect the validity 
of consent obtained." 194 The court further stated that "a serious 
misrepresentation concerning the quality or exten . ')f a physician's professional 
experience ... can be material to the grant of intelligent and informed consent 
to the procedure."'95 
The plaintiff husband in Howard alleged that "defendant's 
misrepresentations induced [him] to consent to a surgical procedure ... that he 
would not have undergone had he known the truth about defendant's 
qualifications.,,'96 Ultimately, the court held that plaintiffs claim was founded 
on "lack of informed consent." 197 
Under informed-consent law, a factor that increases the risk of harm needs to 
be disclosed only if it is material. 198 The Howard court concluded that "if an 
objectively reasonable person could find that physician experience was material 
in determining the medical risk of the corpectomy procedure to which plaintiff 
consented, ... and if a reasonably prudent person in plaintiffs position ... 
essential element in a fraud case). 
192. See Howard, 800 A.2d at 82. 
193. The Howard court cited Spinosa v. Weinstein. 571 N.Y.S.2d 747. 753 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1991 ). for the proposition that 
concealment or failure to disclose [a] doctor's own malpractice does not give rise 
to claim of fraud or deceit independent of medical malpractice, and ... [the] 
intentional tort of fraud [is] actionable only when the alleged fraud occurs 
separately from and subsequent to the malpractice ... and then only where the 
fraud claim gives rise to damages separate and distinct from those flowing from 
the malpractice. 
Huward, 800 A.2d at 82 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
194. Id. at 83. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 84. 
197. Jd. 
198. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554. 557-58 (Okla. 1979). 
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informed of the [doctor's] misrepresentations about his experience would not 
have consented, then a claim ... may be maintained.,,'99 
The court opined that it would be inherently difficult for plaintiffs to meet the 
materiality standard2°O because that would require proof that the defendant's true 
level of experience increased the risk of injury from the procedures the 
defendant performed.201 If what the Howard court means is that the plaintiff 
must quantify with particularity the degree, perhaps in percentage format, to 
which the lack of credentials or experience increased the risk of harm, the 
standard is formidable indeed. That type of approach in medical malpractice 
cases involving the loss-of-a-chance doctrine202 has often denied recovery to 
plaintiffs.203 In Howard, the court clearly intended to set a high bar for recovery 
based on misrepresentation of credentials or experience, for the court explained 
the "stringent test" as imposing "a significant gatekeeper function on the trial 
court to prevent insubstantial claims concerning alleged misrepresentations 
about a physician's experience from proceeding to a jury. ,,204 The court created 
a two-prong test for establishing proximate cause when doctors misrepresent 
their experience: (1) "whether the more limited experience or credentials 
199. Howard, 800 A.2d at 84. New Jersey uses an objective test for proving that 
nondisclosure of a material risk caused harm in informed-consent cases. Most states take a 
similar approach. See, e.g., Ashe v. Radiation Oncology Assocs., 9 S. W.3d 119 (Tenn. 2000) 
(endorsing the majority objective standard). But see Scott, 606 P.2d at 559 (stating that the 
majority rule "severely limits the protection granted an injured patient"). 
200. Howard. 800 A.2d at 84 (stating that "most informed consent issues are unlikely to 
implicate a setting in which a physician's experience or credentials have been demonstrated to 
be a material element affecting the risk of undertaking a specific procedure"). 
20 I. /d. at 84-85 (establishing a demanding standard for proving a substantially increased 
risk). According to the court, a patient must "prove that the actual level of experience possessed 
by [the doctor] had a direct and demonstrable relationship to the harm" and that nondisclosure 
of the doctor's "true level of qualifications and experience increased [the patient's] risk .... " 
Id. 
202. Some courts hold that the loss of a chance to cure a disease or mitigate some other 
medical problem qualifies as a type of harm for which recovery is available. Tortious conduct 
that causes an increased risk of harm, such as a greater risk of developing cancer, is also 
actionable. See Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279, 1283 (N.M. 1999) (stating that "under the 
lost-chance theory, the patient does not allege that the malpractice caused his or her entire 
injury" but ratherthat "the health care provider's negligence reduced the chance of avoiding the 
injury actually sustained"). 
203. See, e.g., Waffen v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 799 F.2d 911, 923 (4th CiT. 
1986) (holding that an admission of "some undefinable chance" that the plaintiff might have 
survived had she been promptly treated was not a sufficient predicate for an award of damages); 
Alberts. 975 P.2d at 1288 (recognizing the loss-of-a-chan~<: doctrine but denying recovery 
because the plaintifffailed to prove that timely medical intervention would have prevented his 
deterioration). 
204. Howard, 800 A.2d at 85. 
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possessed by [the doctor] could have substantially increased [the patient's] risk" 
and (2) "whether that substantially increased risk would cause a reasonably 
prudent person not to consent to undergo the procedure.''205 
If the plaintiff is able to surmount the high bar for proving proximate 
causation of harm, under Howard, recovery is permitted even if the physician 
otherwise exercised care in performing professional services?)6 The 
misrepresentation of credentials or experience is all that is needed to establish 
that a duty was breached. 
Howard offers guidance to courts dealing with the issue of misrepresentation 
of credentials or experience in lawyer-client relationships. Although the 
informed-consent doctrine has yet to find equally clear recognition in the legal 
malpractice field as in medical malpractice, "there is good authority that the 
same principles apply as readily in law as in medicine."207 However, it is 
important to consider carefully what Howard did not decide, what it decided 
205. /d. The court further noted: 
Id. 
The court's gatekeeper function in respect of the first question will require a 
determination that a genuine issue of material fact exists requiring resolution by 
the factfmder in order to proceed to the second question .... [Tlhe trial court must 
conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning both questions 
in order to allow the claim to proceed to trial. 
206. ld. 
207. Johnson, Candor, supra note 4, at 749; see also id. at 749 n.37 (citing, inter alia, Sierra 
Fria Corp. v. Donald J. Evans, P.e., 127 F.3d 175, 179-80 (I st Cir. 1997)). In Sierra Fria, the 
court wrote: 
[Wlhen a client seeks advice from an attorney, the attorney owes the client a duty 
of full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client's interests. This means that 
the attorney must advise the client of any significant legal risks involved in a 
contemplated transaction, and must do so in terms sufficiently plain to pennit the 
client to assess both the risks and their potential impact on his situation. 
Sierra Fria, 127 F.3d at 180 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Sierra Fria court 
found the defendant law firm had repeatedly warned its client of the dangers of consummating 
a property purchase without a survey, and therefore the firm was not liable to the client. [d. at 
184. "Some scholars call for an informed consent doctrine in legal malpractice, such as has 
become a standard in medical malpractice." Lerman, supra note 2, at 670. Professor Lerman 
further states that the informed consent standard for attorneys should be broad, "based on what 
the client might reasonably want to know [whichl would encompass information about issues 
such as expertise, error, and billing that appear to be common subjects of deception." Id. at 685 
n.95; see also id. at 669 n.39 (citing Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client 
Relationship: The Argumentfor Autonomy, 65 N.e. L. REV. 315 (1987)); id. at 670 n.41 (citing 
Roger W. Andersen, Informed Decisionmaking in an Office Practice, 28 B.e.L. REV. 225 
(1987). Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law. 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 307 
(1980), and Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the 
Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 41 (1979»; id. at 701 n.168 (citing DOUGLAS E. 
ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CUENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE 154-55 (1974)). 
2004] MISREPRESENTATION BY LA WYERS 573 
incorrectly, and what advantages an infonned-consent theory has over 
alternative causes of action. First, Howard did not address whether there is a 
professional duty to disclose information about credentials or experience.208 
Rather, the court limited itself to an analysis of theories of recovery applicable 
in a case where a misrepresentation allegedly has been made by an affirmative 
misstatement.209 There is, however, no reason why informed consent principles 
should not be applied to cases involving nondisclosure rather than affirmative 
misrepresentation. Doctors have been held liable for not disclosing, rather than 
actively misrepresenting, material facts,210 and courts have said that the same 
principles apply to lawyers.211 
Still, Howard's general endorsement of an informed-consent approach to 
dealing with issues relating to credentials and experience is sound. "Experience 
and success rate of the physician or surgeon are relevant, not to the decision to 
accept treatment, but to the decision to accept it at the hands of the 
defendant. .. ."212 Recent decisions by courts ofWisconsin,213 Maryland,214 and 
Delaware215 have held that there is a duty on doctors, enforceable in an 
208. Howard, 800 A.2d at 82 (stating that "case law never has held that a doctor has a duty 
to detail his background and experience as part of the required informed consent disclosure; nor 
are we called on to decide that question here"). 
209. Id. at 83. 
210. See, e.g., Haley v. United States, 739 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 1984) (imposing liability 
because physicians did not adequately inform a patient about the potential for wound infection). 
211. See Sierra Fria Corp., 127 F.3d at 179-80. 
212. DOBBS, supra note 126, at 660-61; see also Hales v. Pittman, 576 P .2d 493, 500 (Ariz. 
1978) (opining that, when consenting to medical treatment, "a person needs information not 
only concerning the statistical probabilities of various adverse results ... but also ... 
information concerning the treating physician's experience with the particular procedure"). 
213. See Johnson by Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 507 (Wis. 1996) (holding that, 
when different physicians have substantially different success rates with the same procedure and 
a reasonable person in the patient's position would consider such infornlation material, such 
statistical evidence may be admitted in an informed-consent case in which the plaintiff contends 
that the defendant surgeon failed to disclose his own inexperience); see also Richard A. 
Heinemann, Pushing the Limits of Informed Consent: Johnson v. Kokemoor and Physiciall-
Specific Disclosure, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 1079, 1093-94 (stating that "prior to Johnson, disclosure 
of a physician's comparative risk data had been required in only one jurisdiction," namely 
Arizona); Jennifer Wolfberg, Two Kinds of Statistics, The Kind You Look Up and the Kind You 
Make Up: A Critical Analysis of Comparative Provider Statistics and the Doctrine of Informed 
Consent, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 585, 585 (2002) (opining that "it is just a matter of time before the 
rest of the country eventually follows suit with Wisconsin and broadens the doctrine of informed 
consent to include provisions of provider statistics"). 
214. See Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157, i 65-66 (Md. 2000) (stating th:ll, to obtain informed 
consent, it may be necessary to disclose precisely who will be conducting or superintending the 
procedure or therapy). 
215. See Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that a trial 
court improperly excluded expert testimony that a surgeon breached the standard of care for 
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informed-consent action, to disclose information about their past experience to 
patients.216 There is, however, also authority to the contrary, and a number of 
courts have held that nondisclosure of information about medical credentials or 
experience will not support an action based on lack of informed consent. 217 If 
information about experience and success rate is material to selecting a doctor/Is 
then it is also at least arguably relevant to selecting an attorney. 
Second, Howard' s conclusion that an action for fraud is not available against 
a professional for an outright lie relating to credentials or experience cannot be 
justified. A misstatement of fact, made with knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth, is actionable fraud. The rule is ubiquitously applicable 
to a broad range of contexts.219 Surely, "[a] fraud claim against a lawyer is no 
different from a fraud claim against anyone else.'>220 There is no good reason 
why a false statement of material fact about a doctor's or lawyer's credentials 
or past experience cannot support an action for fraud, provided that each of the 
requirements of the tort is met. More than a century ago, the Supreme Court of 
infonned consent by failing to infonn a patient of his lack of recent aneurysm surgery). 
216. See also Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1198 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that 
a physician's failure to disclose his chronic alcohol abuse to a patient and his wife vitiated their 
consent to surgery). 
217. See, e.g., Abram by Abram v. Children's Hosp., 542 N.Y.S.2d 418, 418-19 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1989) (holding that, under state statutes, a patient could not state a claim for lack of 
infonned consent based on defendant's failure to disclose the providers' qualifications); Duttry 
v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001) (holding that a surgeon's personal characteristics 
and experience are irrelevant to an infonned consent claim); Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213, 
216 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that parents could not state a cause of action for lack of 
infonned consent where they were not infonned before their son's operation that the surgeon 
was an alcoholic and unlicensed to practice medicine); Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263, 
1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that "a surgeon's lack of experience in perfonning a 
particular surgical procedure is not a material fact for purposes ... of failure to secure an 
infonned consent"). 
218. See generally Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere, Doctor. Are You Experienced?: The 
Relevance of Disclosure of Physician Experience to a Valid Informed Consent, 18 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 373 (2002); Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution 
in Illfonlled Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. I (1999). 
Infonnation relating to a professional's prior success rate has been recognized as material 
in other areas as well. See. e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Commonwealth Fin. 
Group, 874 F. Supp. 1345, 1353-54 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that misrepresentations regarding 
the trading record and experience of a tinn or broker are fraudulent because "past success and 
experience are material factors which a reasonable investor would consider when deciding to 
invest ... through that finn or broker"). 
219. Findings of fraud range from prosaic assertions contained in the balance sheets, on one 
hand, see Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931), to dicey 
conversations used to induce another to have sex, on the other, see Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 
198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
220. Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
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Michigan held that misrepresentation about the credentials of a physician's 
assistant was actionable deceit.Z21 
Third, the informed-consent theory also offers considerable advantages for 
dealing with the difficult question of whether an attorney has a duty to disclose 
facts within the scope of a fiduciary relationship relating to credentials or 
experience.222 The two-part test for proximate causation articulated in Howard 
offers a reasonable approach to dealing with issues of liability based on 
nondisclosure.223 Absent proof that the nondisclosure by the lawyer involved 
facts basic to the transaction,224 facts not reasonably discoverable,225 or facts that 
were required to be disclosed because of the adversity of interests between the 
lawyer and client,226 or by the demands of reasonable care,227 the scope of 
liability should be tightly limited. Using the informed-consent rationale 
articulated in Howard, recovery would be permitted only where the defendant's 
deficiency in credentials or experience increased the risk of harm that the 
plaintiff suffered and a reasonable person would not have consented to the 
representation because of the increased risk. 228 
Finally, in the medical context, some courts have held the availability of an 
adequate informed-consent remedy obviates the need for an additional action 
based on breach of trust. 229 Presumably, attorney-defendants could argue that 
the same limitations should apply in the lawyer-client context if the judiciary 
221. See De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881). De May involved a physician who 
brought a young man without medical qualifications to the plaintiff s home to assist him in 
attending to a woman while she gave birth. /d. at 146. Because the assistant's lack of training 
was not disclosed. the court held that the woman's consent to his presence and touching did "not 
preclude her from maintaining an action and recovering substantial damages upon afterwards 
ascertaining his true character." Id. at 149. The court found that both the doctor and his alleged 
assistant were "guilty of deceit" for "obtaining admission at such a time and under such 
circumstances without fully disclosing [the assistant's] true character," and thus. the plaintiff 
could recover damages. Id. 
222. See supra Part II.A.3. 
223. See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73 (N.J. 2002). 
224. See supra Part II.A.I. 
225. See supra Part II.A.2. 
226. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
228. See Howard, 800 A.2d at 85. 
229. See Hales v. Pittman. 576 P.2d 493. 497 (Ariz. 1978) ("We do not believe that the law 
in Arizona should be extended to recognize a new cause of action based on breach of trust when 
an adequate remedy for this case already exists."); see also Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496. 
503 (Ill. 2000) (holding that a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, based on a 
physician's failure to disclose his alleged financial interest in a medical incentive fund. could 
not be maintained because it was duplicative of a medical negligence claim). 
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recognizes an informed-consent action against lawyers who misrepresent 
credentials or experience.230 
IV. Conclusion 
Whether attorneys can be held liable for statements made, or matters not 
disclosed, regarding their credentials or experience are questions of ubiquitous 
importance. The questions implicate concerns that are continuously relevant in 
law practice and potentially bear upon every actual or potential lawyer-client 
relationship. How these queries are answered will set the standard for the 
conduct of attorneys in thousands of law offices. The answers will also 
influence what information is provided or denied to millions of consumers of 
legal services. 
Basic principles of American tort law provide useful guidance in defining the 
disclosure obligations of attorneys. But like tort law itself, the answers are not 
simple. What an attorney may, must, or may not do is determined by a matrix 
of rules, which speak to an array of policy considerations that have shaped the 
law of fraud, fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and informed consent. 
By way of summary, with respect to material matters relating to their 
credentials and experience: Attorneys must not engage in intentional, reckless, 
or negligent falsification of the facts. 23 ! Attorneys must disclose facts that are 
basic to the transaction,232 not reasonably discoverable,233 or directly relevant to 
the representation.234 Attorneys must also disclose information that is necessary 
to prevent partial statements from being misleading235 or that is otherwise called 
for by the duty of reasonable care236 or by an actual adversity of interests 
between lawyer and client.237 Moreover, attorneys may express favorable 
opinions about their qualifications, but in doing so, they must not r;,;isrepresent 
their state of mind or imply false facts. 238 Finally, attorneys must exercise 
230. Cj. Aiken v. Hancock, 115 S.W.3d 26, 28-29 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding that a former 
client's allegations that his attorney falsely represented that he was prepared to try the case and 
that an expert witness was prepared to testify were actionable under a theory of legal 
malpractice, but did not constitute a claim for breach of fiduciary duty). 
231. See supra Part II.C (discussing outright lies) and Part lILA (discussing negligent 
misrepresentation). 
232. See supra Part II. A. I. 
233. See supra Part III.A.2. 
234. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing disclosures called for by new 
developments in representation). 
235. See supra Part U.B.1 (discussing half-truths). 
236. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
237. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing when the duty of "absolute and perfect candor" 
applies). 
238. See supra Part n.B.2. 
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reasonable care to ensure that clients are able to give informed consent to 
decisions pertaining to the representation. 239 Complying with these rules, though 
difficult, is an essential step in assuring that clients are treated fairly by those 
who represent their interests. 
239. See supra Part III.B. 
